


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## **Soviet Union**

### ***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 4, April 1990

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# Soviet Union SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 4, April 1990

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13 July 1990

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## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

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### THEORETICAL METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

#### Efficiency—Theory, Methodology, Practice

905D0016A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
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[Article by Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev, academician, secretary of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Vladislav Sergeyevich Khabarov, director of the International Business School at the Forecasting NPO [Scientific-Production Association] of the TsENDISI of the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of technical sciences and professor; Yuriy Ilich Chernyak, chief of the Systems Research Department of the Forecasting NPO of the TsENDISI of the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of economic sciences and professor]

[Text] Soviet society is living through a stormy, complex and contradictory time, a time of perestroika. A street-demonstration, slogan and strike boom has literally engulfed the nation, having exacerbated to the limit the already acute economic, sociopolitical and spiritual situation. Hundreds and thousands of people assemble for meetings, demonstrations, various sorts of gatherings and listen with rapture to the merciless criticism of the "upper clique" and the illusory promises of the various sorts of ultraperestroika supporters. And at the same time, thousands of railroad cars and containers with food, consumer goods, equipment, preassembled units and parts remain unloaded in many regions of the nation.

And everywhere demands are heard on the state—give us millions and billions of rubles, give us this, that and everything. But for some reason, voices are not heard which offer even a million above what is due to the state or society. Even this which is due is often not given! Deliveries to the national supplies are carried out stingily. The violating of contractual obligations has almost become the rule. Each person tries to pull our social blanket onto himself.

Enthralled with glasnost, self-reproach and criticism of all and everything, we have somehow forgotten that it is possible to distribute only what has been produced or made by human hands and reason. We have forgotten that the law discovered by K. Marx of the increase in social labor productivity operates in the gigantic, extraordinarily complex system of society's life. This is an absolute law of social development in the sense that it is equally valid for all socioeconomic formations, determining the objective necessity for the replacement of one formation by another, less efficient, that is, one providing greater social labor productivity.

Under the conditions of commodity production, this law is manifested as the law of value, and the essence and the mechanism of operation of this law were disclosed by K. Marx in "Capital." The concept established by Marx of spontaneous growth is the most important category explaining, in particular, the content of the concept of the efficiency of one or another society and the method of production inherent to it. In defining capital as the spontaneously growing value, Marx pointed out that precisely here runs the boundary between scientific and vulgar bourgeois political economy. This spontaneous growth occurs in a complete cycle of production—exchange—consumption, that is, ultimately in the process of satisfying social need. The rate of capital's spontaneous growth calculated by the interest charged on capital, that is its efficiency, is higher the greater the ability of the capitalist for survival and success. Marx established that the law of value—an abstract social relation—operates as a specific demand for each capitalist, that is, invest capital where it is more efficient and where the interest on capital is higher.

Our society has had to employ this law of value and its categories as the most important instrument for measuring social efficiency and correlating any types of labor for satisfying any social demands. Its significance as an universal measurement of efficiency will grow even more as commodity-monetary relations develop and as a socialist market is established. In the analysis by K. Marx of the primary element of commodity production—the creating of a commodity as a unity of consumer and exchange value—are to be found all the basic relationships of the concepts of efficiency and quality. The dual nature of labor embodied in a commodity—abstract labor and concrete labor—makes it possible to define efficiency as the ratio of the actual labor expenditures on producing a good to the socially necessary ones, and the concept of quality as the relative consumer value, that is, the property of a commodity to more fully satisfy a certain social need in comparison with other commodities.

Efficiency is a relation and is expressed by relative values and it cannot be expressed by an absolute value. Efficiency is the ratio of results to expenditures or, more precisely, the relation of the results minus expenditures to expenditures in a unit of time. It is manifested in the aggregate of the completed acts of production—exchange—consumption and is ultimately expressed in the growth of social labor productivity in the national economy. Nevertheless, we can measure the various aspects of efficiency, including economic, technical, scientific and social, corresponding to the various types of labor activity, and compare and correlate among themselves the different variations of these labor processes and the corresponding national economic systems.

For this there also are particular aspects of efficiency which gain expression in its various criteria and which are valid, however, only in the instance that they derive from the national economic criterion of efficiency. Attempts to construct independent efficiency criteria for

technical or other systems directly in physical units lead to a separation from the theory of Marx, to a loss of the national economic commonness and integrity in the process of social reproduction.

The concept of "quality" is inseparably linked to the concept of "efficiency." An assessment of quality is made continuously in each act of commodity exchange. "Since a commodity is purchased by a purchaser not because it has value but because it is a 'consumer value' and is consumed for certain goals, then it goes without saying: 1) that consumer values are 'valued,' that is, their quality is studied (in precisely the same manner as their quantity is measured, weighed and so forth)" [1]. Consumer value is the capacity to satisfy human needs and consequently quality is always measured quantitatively from the view of satisfying a given need. Quality permits only quantitative differences in satisfying need. Two different consumer values differ not only quantitatively. Different consumer values are not commensurable between themselves as they satisfy different needs. A better quality commodity with the same outlays of socially necessary labor has a greater exchange value, since it is capable of better satisfying human needs (to serve better, more dependably, longer and so forth). Under capitalist conditions, the quality of goods is determined only by considerations of maximizing the surplus value; under our conditions high quality is an independent goal in production directed at satisfying the needs of the workers. At the same time, we have not developed an effective system for quality control. State acceptance has not helped and has merely given rise to a new, largely useless detachment of inspectors.

The task of science is not only to define the concepts of economic and social efficiency and quality, but also to provide the economic planning bodies with an instrument for taking efficient decisions. Here it is important to design primarily a system of efficiency criteria (considering quality) for the national economic plans, the major national economic programs and the large interdisciplinary projects. This system is to be based on the law of value as an objective law of social development. But for taking specific national economic decisions, the abstractions expressing social relations should be deciphered and separated into components. Here two interrelated areas of work are examined. The first is an analysis of the material and physical aspect of the processes of social production. The second is a detailed analysis of the dynamics of these processes and a clear and the fullest most possible consideration of the time factor.

Up to now, we have remained within the limits of technology and the physically measured values. However, it is known that the work can be purposeless and the energy of society can be squandered, if it does not create consumer goods which reach the consumer and satisfy social need. Here the conversion of physical values into economic ones commences. The physical concept of "work" is carried out in labor if its result finds a consumer. "From the social viewpoint," wrote K.

Marx "labor productivity rises also with the saving of labor. The latter includes not only the savings of the means of production but also the elimination of any useless labor" [2].

Unfortunately, no one has yet estimated how much useless labor is consumed in our country. Hundreds of millions of rubles of unsold products have accumulated, that is, the products which have not found a consumer. Certainly enormous material and labor resources as well as finances were spent on the production of this. A vivid example here would be the activities of the former Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources] which spent scores of billions of rubles on irrigation and drainage. As a result, enormous areas of plowed lands and pastures and forests were flooded having swept away many villages and towns from their age-old site, and the swamps were so drained that many rivers were deprived of their natural intake of water. Exclusion of useless labor is an important means for increasing production efficiency and product quality.

The basic aim of socialist production is a maximum satisfaction under the given conditions of the needs of the workers and this can be reflected in the criterion of the rate of satisfying social needs.

From the viewpoint of the concepts examined above, this will be a function of the time of the potential opportunity of society, the coefficient of the improvement of technology and the coefficient of the progressiveness of organization and management. The ratio of the rate of satisfying social needs to the size of the population provides the amount of labor productivity and its unit of measurement is per capita capacity.

Such a type of criterion in principle provides a developed tool for detailed analysis and planning of the development rates and proportions with a clear physical sense for each employed concept. But its application presupposes a developed informational and computational base for the planning and management system.

For assessing the efficiency of different designs, capital investment models or comparing examples of technical systems, where it is difficult to assess their direct contribution to increasing social labor productivity, a less complete but simpler method is essential. Such a method is provided by employing directly an analytical expression of the law of value with the incorporation into it of the basic parameters of the time structure for the given national economic phenomenon or system.

Whether we are examining a new technical article or system, a new enterprise, a newly developed deposit or major industrial complex—for each of these there is a characteristic definite economic life cycle. As long as the given system exists in the form of an ideal or plan, it does not consume anything but it also does not produce anything; as soon as the first ruble is invested in construction or development, its economic life begins, where the rate of the processes is the crucial factor.

A complete life cycle of an economic system can be divided into four stages. In the first—construction or manufacturing—society merely makes outlays. From the moment the completion of the project (fully completed, in stages or gradually), the construction expenditures are replaced by operating ones and to this over time are added ever-progressing repair expenditures (or expenditures on replacing components). From this same moment, the project begins to bring income which is determined by the volume of the sold product output (with demand for it) and by the prices for it.

The second stage in the life of the system—the repayment period—is the time during which the total aggregate (cumulative) income is compared with the total cumulative expenditures, that is, when society will recover the expended means.

Of significantly greater interest is the third stage where the project is operating for society, it is “earning” interest on the investments, providing an excess of aggregate income over expenditures by a certain number of times. It is during this and only during this period that the project contributes to the growth of the people’s prosperity and to the growth rate of social labor productivity. It is precisely during this period that the given system provides society with the means which can be invested in the creation of new projects.

Finally, the final period is the time of diminishment when, due to a number of factors (the aging of the equipment and production methods, increased repair expenditures, the depletion of resources, the drop in demand and prices related to the appearance of new, higher-quality articles), the facility operates with a diminishing return and is a burden on the economy, and reduces social labor productivity. In this instance production should be reconstructed or completely shut down.

The type of function of net income (minus all types of expenditures) and which is a function of many time variables is extremely complex and is not calculated by modern mathematical economics models. But proceeding from the formula of the compound interest, it is possible to establish with good approximation the linkage (in the form of a formula or table) between the period from the start of investments to the time of the doubling of income and the interest on investment. Thus, here it is a question not of the time of the recovery of the expended money (or the repayment time), but rather the growth rate of the invested funds and this precisely corresponds to the concept of value and is directly commensurable with the general economic criterion for the growth rate of social labor productivity.

The linkage of the calculated interest on investments with increased labor productivity in the system of social production is obvious as average interest on investments according to the economic system as a whole provides for the amount of the growth rate of labor productivity in it.

The more complete consideration of the law of value and the time factor in the intersectorial and sectorial methods for assessing capital investment and new equipment efficiency should lead to a number of positive consequences. Among the factors which determine investment effectiveness in an obvious form is the shortening of the construction time and the improvement of construction quality, great reliability of equipment and better quality for the scientific and technical level of the produced product. On the other hand, the period of the “active life” of economic installations is determined precisely where the exceeding of this period is not rational to operate them.

In the work of improving efficiency and raising quality, a predominant portion of the workers is directly involved with the production processes. Here, each of the national economic workers can be provided with a specific tool necessary at his labor post for taking effective decisions. At the same time, the cost indicators expressed in money carry within them already analyzed, compressed and consolidated information where, in using the words of K. Marx, there is not only a notion of the specific consumer values but also the very relation of value [see 3]. For this reason, the question arises of working out a range of physically measurable efficiency criteria which would disclose and decipher the physical sense of the main value criteria for designers and production engineers.

In calculating the productive forces in England, K. Marx directly in units of capacity correlated the productive force of live labor against the productive force of the labor embodied in the form of machines. In simple physical labor, the power of man, a horse and the indicator horsepower of machines is completely commensurate. But a unit of machine power is always cheaper than a unit of human power and scientific and technical progress consists precisely in the ongoing replacement of human labor by machine labor and by a continuous rise in machine power calculated on a per capita basis.

In the most general sense, any machine is a channel for the transmission of power. In this sense, all machines are comparable in terms of the amount of capacity on the output and on the input, that is, in terms of their efficiency. This provides the basis for constructing a general theory of machines which is based upon the law of the conservation of power equivalent to the law of the conservation of energy. So why not offer physics and the technical science to work out a system of physically measurable efficiency criteria for all machines and the production processes realized by them?

The elaboration of this system is a concern of social sciences, and in particular sociology, because neither in physics nor in technology is there a concept of efficiency; from the position of these sciences the paradox seems insoluble: in what manner does the work of a system of

machines the efficiency of each of which is less than one provide an aggregate effect where the seeming efficiency is greater than one.

In moving from abstract labor to concrete, we encounter what at first glance is its infinite types. As a first putting into order, it can be pointed out that people with the aid of machines realize only the physical processes known to science (and not all of them). For this reason, the first most important task is to establish the relationship of all the known physical laws and regularities of a standard transformation for the values of their measurement.

In remaining within the context of the concept of simple labor, it is possible in a limited manner to generalize all the labor processes realized by people with the aid of machines. These will be the processes of the transporting of matter, energy or information and carried out in time or in space.

In real life they occur, of course, together in various combinations. This notion can underlie a classification of the functions of any technical devices and the purpose of any production processes and this makes it possible to compare their relative efficiency between one another as well as seek out better variations for realizing technical systems with set functions.

The results of social labor embody not only work in the physical sense but also the idea. "At the end of the labor process," wrote K. Marx, "a result is obtained which even at the beginning of this process existed in man's mind, that is, ideally. Man not only alters the form of what has been given by nature; in what was given by nature, he realizes also his creative goal which as a law defines the method and nature of his actions and to which he should subordinate his will" [4]. In utilizing the knowledge collectively accumulated by mankind, people send into nature effects, the response to which in terms of energy is greater than the stimulus. Precisely this information action explains the seeming paradox for the increase in capacity obtained as a result of the labor process in comparison with the expended capacity. Here the products of human labor are more efficient the greater the human knowledge embodied in them and the greater amount of information they carry.

Ultimately, things are the embodiment of human ideas, their second existence. And this provides the grounds to assess and measure the very efficiency of ideas. A rise in labor productivity in any form of labor activity is carried out only by the manifestation and implementation of new ideas. In principle, the effectiveness of any idea can be measured by its contribution to increasing social labor productivity, but it is a different question that this is very difficult to realize directly and too much information is needed on the possible scale of employing the idea and on the proportional amount of the types of production transformed by the given idea in the system of social production. A flexible and universal instrument for a cost evaluation provides an opportunity to eliminate these difficulties.

On the capitalist market, ideas are sold as any other commodity, that is, the sale of a patent or license in no way differs from the sale of a motor vehicle or a plant. Under the conditions of socialist production, ideas are not always sold but it is completely essential that these ideas be assessed for selecting for prior implementation those which to the greatest degree contribute to increasing social labor productivity. The value of an idea can be determined by assessing the excess of the interest for an investment into a new good or new technology above the average interest for the goods or technology with the same function, that is, serving to satisfy the same social need. Of course, here it is essential to consider many fine points determined by the type and purpose of the ideas which should be investigated.

The sphere of national economic activity which is specialized in the production of new ideas is science. Fundamental sciences, as is known, observe and explain the effect of the interaction in nature and society and construct languages for a uniform description of these interactions. This is the source which fosters scientific and technical progress. The most important thing in improving efficiency and quality is combining a knowledge about the effect of the interaction with the area of its useful application and which expands the social opportunities in one or another area. A classification of scientific ideas for working out a method for assessing their effectiveness can be based on the principle of dividing the possibilities of society into potential, physical and economic. The first class of ideas is concerned with new sources of capacity; this is an area chiefly of technical sciences. The second class of ideas deals with new, better methods of using capacity to produce material and spiritual goods; this is an area of technical and biological sciences and partially social sciences. The third class of ideas deals with better methods of linking the production of material and spiritual goods with their consumption and accelerating the process of satisfying social needs, that is, the growth of social labor productivity. This is an area of socioeconomic sciences concerning the management of the socialist production process and all social life in its various aspects. The times demand that these sciences, including sociology, bring the conclusions and recommendations to a degree of accuracy and soundness would ensure the realization of a unified policy directed at increasing the efficiency of social production.

It should not be doubted that solely on the basis of the accelerated development of science and technology can we successfully carry out the tasks of perestroika, particularly in the economic sphere. But for now our economic mechanism is such that it rejects modern scientific and technical achievements. There are no proper conditions, no effective incentives. Since the volume of sales in rubles remains the main planning and reporting indicator for the operation of the enterprises, associations, ministries and departments, since labor productivity is measured by a fraction, the denominator of which is the declining ruble and the numerator the

number of workers (clearly not a Marxist method and it is hard to establish who confirmed this in our fatherland), and since, finally, profit operates in the role of the basic indicator for work under cost accounting conditions, a Soviet entrepreneur shuns scientific and technical progress. It involves a multiplicity of troubles such as reconstruction on a new technical and technological basis, the retraining of workers and specialists, the reequipping of production, the establishing of new subcontracting ties, contractual relations which are dreadfully unreliable, particularly under conditions of providing freedom to the enterprises in selecting partners and consumers. Why should there be all of this? It is much easier to steadily increase prices under various indexes such as "N" (innovation) or "D" (contractual prices). As a result, the sales volume in rubles "grows" without any relation to scientific and technical progress. On the other hand, there is a catastrophic drop in the production of consumer values, that is, articles essential for persons to satisfy at times the most elementary, urgent needs. Chief articles are eliminated and these are so essential to man, particularly to children, students and pensioners. Inflation grows, the deficit broadens and against this background play the innumerable bosses of the shadow economy, the speculators and other dubious individuals. They stuff their pockets without any progress in science and technology.

A paradoxical situation has come into being: practice and production calmly go on without both a policy and without science and technology. They are somehow "independent." In the meanwhile, prices are rising and the people, our great Soviet people, become ever-poorer.

There can be no doubt that the tasks of perestroika can be carried out solely on a basis of accelerated scientific and technical development. Scientific ideas are an important source for a rise in social labor productivity and for this reason our progress along the path of perestroika to a significant degree is determined by the progressiveness of the mechanism for stimulating and assessing scientific ideas. In this mechanism there still is too much that is intuitive and the choice of the areas of research is still largely determined by a subjective awareness of the social imperative while scientific measurement for now is able to measure rather the secondary economic organizational factors in science rather than the main one of the value and effectiveness of ideas. The management of science should be put on a scientific basis. The mechanism for the "ordering of ideas" should be clearly formulated in the form of regularly updated lists of required discoveries and inventions while the financing and encouraging of research should proceed from a preliminary calculation of the value and national economic effectiveness of the ideas.

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Economic efficiency as the most important indicator for the progressiveness of a society, is a component, subordinate element in the broader and more important concept of social efficiency. "Only socialism," wrote V.I.

Lenin, "will provide an opportunity to extend widely and properly subordinate social production and the distribution of products according to scientific considerations and concerning how to make the life of all workers the easiest and providing them with the opportunity of prosperity [5]. Effective from the social viewpoint is the process which helps to achieve social goals confronting the socialist society and the most important of these is the shaping of a well-rounded individual.

We plan the production of coal, steel and electric power for 20-25 years to come. But it would be even more important to plan the development of the human personality itself for this period. For looking to the future, we cannot help but consider those new ideas and scientific and technical solutions which appear in the minds of people and those better methods for organizing social production which will be aimed at satisfying the high spiritual and material social needs. It is not to be excluded that in this still remote future many things will not exist which surround us now.

The task of planning social values in a society of the future can arise only on the basis of an ideal planned economy. Here we have accumulated experience. But it is essential to point out that social planning does not come down to working out a national economic plan.

It is time to more fundamentally revise the ratio between the A and B groups in our production and capital investment policy for these sectors must be carried out in favor of the B group, that is, the production of consumer goods and food. This would help if not to eliminate then substantially to reduce the scarcity of goods for people and the lack of which is literally stifling them. If we could eliminate this scarcity and feed and cloth the people, then many of our difficulties would be overcome. Social tension which our society is experiencing would decline.

There is one other area of capital investments (and it is recognized in the world) of investments in man, that is, his education and skills. An important if not the most important task for us is to increase the professionalism of the managers, the specialists, workers and scientists. Here science is indispensable and this is also indispensable for science. Without increasing the education and skills of the workers, without their technical, computer and informational training, progress in society and success in perestroika is impossible. It is also extremely essential to raise the general cultural level of our people including the spiritual culture, social intercourse, discussion, disputes and so forth.

We are moving toward a civilized society under the law, toward democracy. All of this is impossible without consolidation, without tolerance for the opinion of opponents, even if they are a minority. Here irreproachable logic, clear rhetoric, an individual psychology, or even psychoneurology, if you wish, are indispensable here. And, of course, philosophy as well which shapes a broad view of the world in humans and in which the primary place is given to man.

All of this must be planned. But in order to plan, it is essential to be able to measure and it is very difficult to measure social values. However, difficulty does not mean a fundamental impossibility.

The most important measurement of social values is social time and its structure and primarily the ratio of working and free time and which in the ideas of capital K. Marx would be the basic measure of the wealth of a communist society [6]. The structure of free time, the share of education in it, of skill improvement, social work, recreation, aesthetic development and physical conditioning requires a condensing and a constant increase in capacity. Both the rhythms and pace of production and the informational saturation of free time are growing.

At the same time, the methods of measuring the saturation of working and free time are presently little, very little developed. Here we see an urgent task for our sociological science which, let us say it frankly, has been sitting it out on the sidelines.

Social time, however, is not the only measure of social values. The works of Soviet scientists have set out the basic principles for constructing a system of social evaluations which would include a full-blown system of economic assessments of production efficiency, production and consumer quality, the level and quality of satisfying material needs as well as assessments reflecting the state and development of other "potentials" in society, namely scientific, cultural and social. While the economic evaluations are directly oriented at the law of value formulated by K. Marx, social evaluations are aimed at the dialectical method of reflecting the basic law of social development, the law of the saving of time.

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The problem of providing an ongoing rise in the efficiency of social production, like all other aspects of social life, by its very nature requires a systems solution on the basis of the integrating of all areas of science. Its main core can only be Marxism-Leninism, Marxist materialist philosophy and the dialectical method. But in order to serve as the basis for the integration of precise, natural and biological sciences, Marxism-Leninism must incorporate in itself a strict axiomatic theory constructed in accord with modern general scientific principles. Here we can only briefly describe the subject of this theory and its general outlines.

Some 30 years ago, in speaking at the All-Union Conference on the Philosophical Questions of Modern Natural Science (Moscow, October 1958), the Academician of the Estonian Academy of Sciences G.I. Naan pointed out the incompleteness of the fundamental laws of nature and the lack of at least one very general law. The laws of conservation, and primarily the law of the conservation of energy, are responsible, in his words, for the stability and succession of world order. Another law—the second law of thermodynamics—describes the direction of natural processes toward ever-greater disorder, chaos and

the immobilization of energy. "At the same time, in nature we observe the most diverse processes, so to say of an antientropic nature, processes of becoming, if these are taken on the philosophical level, processes of the rise of the complex out of the simpler. Possibly the processes, for example, of nucleogenesis, the rise of stars, planets and galaxies, the origin of life, at least in part, are so hard to discover because we do not know the corresponding general law and we remain under the sway of the deeply rooted notion that all these phenomena can be explained only as a rare exception to the general rule" [7].

However, this fundamental law already exists in the social sciences and it was formulated by K. Marx and developed by V.I. Lenin on the basis of an analysis of gigantic material, an entire "Mont Blanc of facts" in the words of Engels.

While the necessity has been repeatedly pointed out of "pulling up" social sciences to the level of the natural ones in the sense of mastering the axiomatic method and mathematical apparatus, one must also speak of the "pulling up" of natural sciences to an understanding of the development laws of society and the mastery of these laws. It is a question not only of mutual understanding but also the joint bringing of this law to the level of practical utilization in all areas of social production and the social life of our society.

Life and the living connects and organizes the energy which is continuously dispersed by inanimate nature. The law of the evolution of living nature requires the incorporation of the concept of efficiency as the ability to offset entropy, to survive and provide spontaneous growth. From the standpoint of this law, it was necessary to have the appearance in the process of evolution of reason as a specialized antientropic organ which provided great effectiveness of the species. The appearance of collective reason in the process of evolution—initially on the scale of small groups and evermore widely with the process of historical development—meant a qualitative shift in evolution with the appearance of human society and its isolation from the entire kingdom of living nature.

There are two fundamental distinctions of mankind from all other forms of life. The first is the ability to mobilize bonded energy not only in the form of the growth of the biomass but also in the form of the means of production. The second is the ability to transmit acquired experience not only in the form of the genetic code, but also in the form of material and spiritual culture in sign systems of common human utilization, among which the most important is writing. This has provided mankind with such growth and such an ongoing increase in efficiency which has not been known by the natural evolution of species.

Mankind has followed a complex and protracted path of development. It is striving for the ideal of a communist society in which, in contrast to the animal world, man ceases to be the unconscious object of the action of



spontaneous laws. On the basis of the understood laws of social development, the members of this society organize social production and social life in a direction of ever-greater efficiency with a continuously rising growth rate. Here is the jump from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.

Much, very much remains for us to do in order to cross the boundary from the prehistory to the authentic history of mankind. We have taken certain steps. We, the working people, were victorious in October 1917, we turned a generally backward nation into a great power and we crushed the best military machine of Hitler. We rebuilt our completely devastated economy.

But then not everything has gone as we would wish. We have largely made Stalinism a matter of the past. We condemned subjectivism roundly. We branded stagnation. But now? We praise where we can.

At the same time, perestroika has not yet provided much to the simple people, to those who stand by the machine tool, work in the thousand-meter-deep mine, or who milk cows from early morning to late at night. Does perestroika really come down to meetings and demonstrations? Certainly it calls for work. For honest work by each person at his job.

In separating himself from the realm of nature, man has completely remained in this realm. And for this reason the laws of material production, the laws of physics and other precise sciences are also a matter for social sciences. Ecology? What sort of science is this? A social or a natural one? It is both. Without the integrating of the natural and social sciences, it is impossible to work out constructive methods for taking decisions in the economic and social processes. It is not merely a matter of the unification or the integration of sciences but rather their mutual penetration and enrichment.

Social needs, both material and spiritual, become physically determined and measurable. Physical, material processes in social production obtain a social evaluation making it possible in each specific instance to determine their efficiency. This is achieved, in particular, with the aid of the above-mentioned generalized concepts of separation and transporting.

The separation in time or in space of social need for specific forms of matter, energy and information, on the one hand, and the opportunity for satisfying these in the process of social production, on the other, can be interpreted as a difference of potentials. V.S. Nemchinov, for example, measured the development potential of economic systems using a model of expanded reproduction. The ranking of potentials was carried out with the aid of transporting (matter, energy, information in time and space) and this is interpreted in terms of kinetic energy. This provides the possibility of linking the physical understanding of power or capacity as a flow of energy in a unit of time with the concept of capacity in the socioeconomic sense, for example, production capacity and intellectual capacity. This makes it possible to then

move on to the interpretation of the information (knowledge, ideas) embodied in the technical and organizational systems in terms of a power booster and thereby measure information processes with the aid of certain physical equivalents. There is nothing unusual in this as we measure temperature, the energy of the colliding of molecules which in principle cannot be measurable by an instrument, with the aid of an equivalent, the degree of the expansion of a metallic or liquid column. The reciprocal penetration of the concepts of natural and social sciences is disclosing ever-new facets of understanding while the method of analogy accelerates and facilitates this process. While there are extensive methods for evaluating the effectiveness of spatial moves, the methods of evaluating the effectiveness of goals, that is, linkages in time, are only now beginning to be examined but undoubtedly will be developed and actually used for improving the planning and management of production and society as a whole.

Of course, in the theory of efficiency there is still much that is unresolved and unclear. But we must introduce clarity and bring the problem to a solution. Soviet science has been guided by the remarkable idea of V.I. Lenin that in the theory of cognition, as in all other areas of science, one must reason dialectically, that is, not to assume our knowledge complete and unchangeable but rather figure out in what manner knowledge appears from ignorance and in what manner incomplete, imprecise knowledge becomes evermore complete and more precise.

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The elaboration of a theory and methodology of efficiency and quality, in terms of importance and in terms of its potential consequences, stands among the most important scientific and technical problems of modern times. In terms of its scale, intersectorial and interdisciplinary nature, it is comparable with the major interdisciplinary developments, for example, the space program.

The USSR has gained great experience in solving large-scale scientific and technical problems and it has also worked out the organizational forms of their planning and implementation. Clearly the solution to the problem of working out a theory and methodology of efficiency and quality with the reaching of practical procedures and computer programs will be carried out the more successfully and rapidly the more fully the principles of specific programmed control are realized.

For mobilizing the broad scientific forces and for drawing in workers from the national economy with great practical experience in the fight for efficiency and quality, there must be a broad discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects of the problem and a debate over the disputed questions. Soviet scientists have a great scientific and theoretical reserve to draw on and a whole series of methods has undergone practical testing. On the other hand, the national economic workers are in sharp need of scientific-procedural materials which

would aid in carrying out the party and government assignments. Without waiting for the complete and final resolution of all theoretical problems, we must begin the planned and systematic publishing of research results and generalizing the practical experience in the struggle for efficiency and quality. Clearly it would be timely to begin preparing an encyclopedia on the problems of efficiency and quality and improving the methods for planning and managing production as well as all other spheres of development in Soviet society.

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## DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOCIAL LIFE

### Sociological Service of First Congress of USSR People's Deputies: First Experience

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[Article by Nugzar Irakliyevich Betaneli, docent on the Chair of Applied Sociology and Social Psychology of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, candidate of psychological sciences and Valentina Viktorovna Lapayeva, senior science associate at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Soviet State Construction and Legislation. This is the first time they appear in our journal]

[Text] In the course of preparing for the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the Congress Sociological Service was established on the basis of the AON [Academy of Social Sciences] under the CPSU Central Committee and the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Soviet State Construction and Legislation. The Service conducted two surveys of public opinion of the Moscow workers before the Congress (May 1989), immediately

after (July 1989)<sup>1</sup> as well as three express polls of the USSR people's deputies directly during the Congress (27 May, 2 June and 9 July).<sup>2</sup>

In line with the absence of experience in polling the deputies during the course of the work of the representative body, the Sociological Service was confronted with the problem of working out a general plan for such research. As the basic methodological principles in the initial stage, the following were adopted: 1) the Sociological Service was not to apply any pressure to the position of the deputies or influence the atmosphere of the Congress; 2) the USSR people's deputy was viewed by the Service not as the object but as the goal of the research. This meant that the tasks of the Service did not include assessing the qualitative characteristics of the deputy corps; the activities of the Service were to be subordinate to the interests of the deputies themselves and aimed at deepening their group self-awareness and achieving consensus at the Congress. It was felt that this same goal was also served by the measures to increase the level of information available to the deputies concerning the state of public opinion and on the demands and interests of the public. As a whole, the sociological support for the Congress was to aid in the consolidation and concord between the deputies and the people. In selecting the range of problems to be studied, the research group was guided chiefly by the desires of the deputies themselves.

**Before and after the Congress: expectations, views of results and prospects.** As the polling of the Moscow workers was to show, in May 1989, some 70 percent of those questioned linked their hopes to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and its decisions. However, even in July, around 70 percent of the Muscovites emphasized that these expectations had not been justified to one degree or another ("rather not justified" with 34 percent and "not justified" with 35 percent). The highest level of disappointment was observed among the scientific-technical intelligentsia and the scientific and technical workers (77 percent), workers in the production and nonproduction spheres (74 percent), and the lowest among workers of the party, soviet, economic and law enforcement bodies and social organizations (54 percent).

After the concluding of the work of the Congress, the number of workers who felt confidence and optimism declined by almost one-half (15-18 May 1989 it was 70 percent and in July 1989, 39 percent); there were stronger feelings of concern and alarm (15-18 May with 29 percent and in July, 43 percent). The highest level of concern was among the scientific-technical intelligentsia (54 percent), the social and humanities and creative intelligentsia (48 percent) and the least high was among the workers (33 percent).

A significant portion of the deputy corps also experienced a feeling of dissatisfaction with the Congress work results. Polls conducted in the course of the sessions showed that the proportional amount of deputies whose

hopes and expectations were not realized varied within limits of 40-42 percent. However, the positions of the individual deputy groups differed significantly from one another: least met were the expectations of the deputies elected from the territorial electoral districts (51 percent) and from the creative unions (61 percent); in the remaining deputy groups, this indicator was significantly lower and averaged 33 percent (from 7 percent among the deputies from the War and Labor Veterans Associations to 39 percent among the deputies from the national-territorial districts).

The disappointment of the working masses was accompanied by a certain decline in the authority of virtually all the elements of society's political system (Table 1). A significant number of Moscow workers was critical of the nation's deputy corps. Only 17 percent of those questioned felt that "all or a majority of the deputies" were worthy of high trust. Here the number of workers who pointed out that "only a minority" or "only individual deputies" were worthy of their title more than doubled (from 25 percent to 54 percent).

**Table 1: Distribution of Replies to the Question "With What Political Institutions Do You Link Your Hopes for an Improvement in the Affairs of the Nation," %**

| Variation of Reply                              | Polls, 1989 |      |
|---|-------------|------|
|   | May         | July |
| Congress of USSR People's Deputies              | 68          | 63   |
| Soviets from the bottom upwards                 | 61          | 55   |
| General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee | 59          | 51   |
| USSR Supreme Soviet                             | 56          | 46   |
| Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet             | 60          | 45   |
| Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers       | 37          | 37   |
| Party as a whole                                | 45          | 36   |
| CPSU Congress                                   | 44          | 35   |
| USSR Council of Ministers                       | 28          | 28   |
| Informal citizen associations                   | 26          | 27   |
| Politburo of CPSU Central Committee             | 32          | 21   |
| Plenum of CPSU Central Committee                | 32          | 21   |
| CPSU Central Committee                          | 30          | 21   |
| National trade unions                           | 20          | 14   |
| Komsomol  | 11          | 9    |
| Political system of nation                      | 31          | 23   |

One of the reasons for the drop which followed the Congress in the image of the USSR people's deputy in the mass mind clearly was the unsatisfied demand of the citizens for the expression and defense of their group, regional and socioclass interests. As was shown by the public opinion poll of the Muscovites conducted after the Congress, 66 percent of the citizens as a whole was not satisfied by the expression of the interests of their

social groups at the Congress. Among them were: 70 percent of the scientific-technical intelligentsia, 68 percent of the humanitarian and creative intelligentsia, 64 percent of the workers in the production and nonproduction spheres and 61 percent of the technical and service personnel.

Another reason for the discovered drop in the image of the deputy in the mass mind is obviously related to the fact that a majority of the voters was expecting quick and noticeable changes in the life of the nation, while the deputies were prepared for a significantly more moderate result from their activities. Some 71 percent of the Muscovites emphasized that they were closest to the positions of the deputies who at the Congress favored "an immediate and decisive change in society." At the same time, judging from the polls conducted at the Congress, only 5 percent of the deputies felt that over the next 2 or 3 years the state of the economy, the standard of living and the material prosperity of the people would improve significantly. A majority of the deputies polled (55 percent) assumed that the state of affairs in this oblast would improve insignificantly, 28 percent felt that they would not improve at all; 11 percent of the deputies found it hard to reply.

**Value orientations of the deputies and the public.** For ascertaining the basic guidelines in the activities of the USSR people's deputies, they were asked the question "what is most important for the nation at present?" (two points could be chosen). The replies were distributed in the following manner: achieving a higher standard of living—74 percent; maintaining order and legality—56 percent; greater participation of the citizens in taking important political decisions and the development of self-government—30 percent; glasnost, freedom of speech, a higher level of criticism and self-criticism—25 percent.

The circumstance that the task of raising the standard of living emerged in first place (and with a significant gap between the second) scarcely needs any commentary. The economic reform has not yet provided any tangible effect. Moreover, there are grounds to speak about a deterioration in the standard of living for a whole number of indicators. This causes serious discontent among the public. Thus, research on public opinion among the Muscovite workers conducted on the threshold of the Congress showed that 40 percent of the Muscovites viewed the situation in the nation as precrisis and 31 percent as actual crisis. It was becoming ever-clearer (and many deputies at the Congress spoke about this) that if in the next few years the standard of living of the public could not be raised somewhat noticeably, confidence in perestroika would be significantly undermined.

Considering the prevailing importance of the standard of living as the most urgent task of the day, the deputies, in selecting the second most important position, in essence sought an adequate means for realizing this goal. The poll showed that maintaining order and legality is such a

means. To a certain degree this shows the orientation of the deputies to stabilize the situation. It can be assumed that the latter is viewed by them as an essential prerequisite for raising the standard of living and which they have promised to their voters.

The designated question of the questionnaire for the deputies duplicated one of the questions of the questionnaire in the all-Union public opinion research conducted in December 1988 by the AON under the CPSU Central Committee.<sup>3</sup> This made it possible to compare the value orientations of the deputies and the public. A comparative analysis disclosed noticeable discrepancies on one, very fundamental point and namely the question of glasnost. "Glasnost, free speech and a higher level of criticism and self-criticism" is a value for 51 percent of the workers, at the same time that only 25 percent of the USSR people's deputies was oriented at this same value in their activities.

One cannot help but note the fact that the deputies more optimistically assessed the achieved level of democracy in the nation (Table 2).

**Table 2: Distribution of Answers to Question "How Do You View the State of the Process of Democratization in the Nation," %**

| Variation of Reply   | Polls, May 1989 |        |
|--|-----------------|--------|
|  | Deputies        | Voters |
| Process of democratization has become irreversible                                   | 21              | 3      |
| Additional measures are needed guaranteeing irreversibility of democratization       | 40              | 22     |
| All that has been undertaken is half measures and more decisive steps are needed     | 34              | 52     |
| Virtually nothing has been done, the process of democratization has not been started | 1               | 18     |
| Difficult to reply   | 4               | 5      |

What are the reasons for such a discrepancy in the value orientations of the deputies and the public which elected them? In order to answer this question, special additional research is essential. At the given stage of the work, we can say with confidence that just one of the reasons is the insufficient informing of the deputies concerning the state of public opinion, the mood and expectations of the voters.<sup>4</sup>

In speaking of the value orientations of the deputies, it is essential, in our view, to specially take up their understanding of the essence of a socialist state under the law. In the Soviet legal literature, this problem is still a matter of debate. The basic differences are related to the attitude toward the principle of the separation of powers. Considering the given circumstance, the deputies were asked the question: "How important for forming a socialist state under the law is the principle of the separation of legislative, executive and judiciary

powers?" The replies were distributed in the following manner: it is of fundamental significance with 80 percent; it is of importance but not fundamental with 8 percent; it does not have any importance at all with 1 percent; hard to answer with 11 percent.

What does such an unanimous position of the deputy corps mean? Certainly, a majority of the deputies proceeded not from a doctrinal interpretation of the problem, not from the theoretical fine points of the notion of the separation of power, but rather from the practical importance of such an approach, from their own notions of the urgent needs in modern political life. An analysis of the speeches by the deputies at the Congress, at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the mass information media shows their great concern over the impotence of the soviets, the actual subordination of the representative bodies to executive power, the complete domination of departmental norm setting and the inhibition of the perestroika processes by the bureaucratized apparatus of the ministries and departments. For this reason, they cannot help but link the possibility of realizing the basic slogan of the times "All Power to the Soviets!" with the separating of legislative and executive power. The deputies are also undoubtedly concerned by the dependence of the courts upon executive and party power on the spot. Nor did the deputies overlook the question of the need for judicial review of the constitutionality of the legal enactments being adopted in the nation.

The consistency and thought given to the position of the deputies on the question of the separation of power can be seen from the fact that a predominant majority of the questioned deputies (79 percent) favored a delimitation of the functions of party and state bodies on a new legislative basis (only 14 percent of the deputies considered the better practices of cooperation between the party and state bodies without amendments in the legislation to be necessary and sufficient, while 6 percent found it difficult to define their position). Here the differentiation in the obtained replies by individual republics indicates that there is a very significant spread of opinions. The problem of delimiting the functions of the party and state bodies is an important aspect in the concept of the socialist state under the law and is most closely linked to the question of the separation of powers as for realizing the principle of a separation of powers it is essential first of all to isolate state power from the system of political power and ensure its sovereignty.

**Deputies and voters.** As our representative bodies begin to assume a suitable place in the structure of state power, the interaction of the deputy with his voters becomes and evermore effective channel for expressing and defending the interests of various social groups and strata as well as social interests as a whole. This circumstance gives rise to a whole series of new, at times unexpected questions. How should a deputy behave in a situation of a conflict of interests of his direct voters and the interests of other social groups and society as a whole? Whose interests should guide him first? When

must he resort to a compromise and when is it essential to firmly defend the position of his voters? What are the ways for seeking out a compromise? What forms of defending voter interests are valid and which ones contradict the principals of parliamentary activity?

The work of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet already to a sufficient degree demonstrated the acuteness and pertinence of these questions. Before our very eyes the members of parliament were repeatedly turned into members of "warring" sides, while parliamentary methods of debate were often replaced by ultimatums and threats. At the same time, it is clear that the main task of the higher representative bodies is not one of "quick response" to the various expectations, demands and claims of the various voter groups but rather to seek out legislative solutions to social problems on the basis of consensus. A law is a general standard expressing universal interest. The objective nature of the legislative process presupposes a conformity of the will and interests of the different strata of society while this places the corresponding demands upon the stance and conduct of the deputies themselves. Probably the categorical imperative of Kant of "act according to the maxim the following of which you at the same time might wish it to be a universal law" applies more to a deputy, a member of the legislative corps than perhaps anyone else.

How do the deputies themselves understand this problem? They were asked the question "Whose interests do you most follow in your deputy activities?" The replies showed the following structure in the priorities of the deputy corps: general human interests with 61 percent; interests of Soviet society as a whole 67 percent; interests of their voters with 52 percent; interests of their social group with 19 percent; interests of another social group to which the deputy does not personally belong with 3 percent.

At first glance, the obtained ratio of priorities (67 percent of the deputies followed the interests of Soviet society as a whole and 52 percent the interests of their voters) fully ensures a predominance of general interests over group ones and this is essential for taking a just decision. However, more concrete analysis shows that this predominance in favor of general state interests has been obtained at the expense of the position of deputies from the social organizations. Thus, 67 percent of the deputies from the territorial and national-territorial districts and an equal number of deputies from the social organizations were oriented at the interests of Soviet society as a whole; 61 percent and 33 percent, respectively, followed the interests of their voters. Thus, for the deputies from the districts there is a characteristic approximately equal degree of orientation to the interests of both their voters as well as society as a whole (a difference of 6 percent can scarcely be considered substantial). Consequently, for this portion of the deputy corps, the general state interests are not predominant. The lack in the deputies from the district of a clearly expressed awareness of the predominant importance of

general interests over the interests of the individual groups cannot help but cause alarm.

As hypotheses which might explain such a noticeable difference in the positions of the two deputy groups on the given, in our view, very fundamental question, the following suppositions can be voiced: 1) deputies from the districts, in being (in contrast from the deputies representing social organizations) elected by the entire strata of the public in their electoral district are more inclined to identify the interests of their voters with the interests of all society; 2) deputies from districts more strongly than the deputies from social organizations feel their dependence upon voter instructions, in fearing recall.

These hypotheses need testing out in the course of subsequent research. At the given stage, we are forced to refrain from a more concrete assessment of the obtained empirical data. However, on the question of the second hypothesis, we cannot help but note the in no way indisputable, in our view, character of the imperative deputy mandate reinforced in the legislation and in accord with which a deputy is obliged to seek the carrying out of the instructions of the voters or the social organization and in the event that he does not justify their trust, can be recalled at any time under the procedures set by the law. In the developed capitalist countries which have great experience in parliamentary activities, a so-called free mandate has been adopted and under this a deputy does not bear legal responsibility to the voters and consequently is not obliged to carry out their instructions and cannot be recalled ahead of time. It is felt that this makes it possible for the deputies to be guided more by general national interests and not local, group ones and during their term as a deputy protects them against pressure from the voters the positions of whom, as is known, far from always correspond to general interests.

The posing of the question concerning the possibility of the freedom of a USSR people's deputy from his voters is uncustomary for us. In theory, this problem has not been worked out. As for the public, they do not see any problem here. The public opinion polls have shown that a predominant majority of the citizens favors roll-call voting of the deputies (from 83 percent of those polled in Alama-Ata to 93 percent in Tbilisi) [1].

This means that the voters want to constantly keep the deputies in the field of their critical attention and this (in light of the unclearly settled institution of recalling the deputy) can become a powerful factor of pressure. Such a position is clearly explainable for the public. However, it is obvious that science on this question cannot follow public opinion and should not ignore the experience of the theory and practice of countries with developed parliamentarianism. It seems that the independence of a people's deputy from all forms of outside pressure cannot help but include a certain degree (the question is precisely how much) of their freedom from voter pressure.

Is it of interest just what the deputies themselves think about this? To a certain degree it is possible to judge this from their replies to the question about whether they are guided by certain interests in their deputy activities or follow their own understanding of the problem. Such a formulating of the question was somewhat unexpected for the deputies, as it ran contrary to the established notion of the deputy as a "servant of the people." Nevertheless, 15 percent of the deputies checked this point of the questionnaire.

According to the various social groups, the answers were distributed in the following manner: 12 percent of the deputies from the territorial districts; 17 percent from the national-territorial districts; 17 percent from the CPSU; 15 percent from the trade unions; 22 percent from the cooperative organizations; 22 percent from the Komsomol; 14 percent from the women's associations; 6 percent from the war and labor veteran associations; 15 percent from the scientific worker associations; 21 percent from the creative unions; 24 percent from the other social organizations. In our view, the given indicator basically reflects the view of the deputy corps concerning the independence of their judgments, their independence and readiness for personal responsibility for the decisions being taken. Such a position by the people's deputies does not mean that they ignore the interests of their voters, and it is merely a necessary prerequisite for considering these interests in the context of the whole, the law based on general interest.

Characteristically, the designated indicator is higher among those deputy groups which clearly to a greater degree than the others are involved with the spheres of social life requiring new, nonstandard decisions and creative approaches (it is a question above all of nationality questions, youth problems and the restoring and renewing of spiritual values).

The problem of the interaction of deputies and voters was also influenced by the question of whose aid the deputies would count on upon returning from the Congress. It turned out that they would rely primarily on their voters (64 percent); some 16 percent would like to have relied on their aid but were not certain of it; 2 percent were not counting on the aid of the voters and 1 percent of the deputies assumed that the voters would oppose them<sup>5</sup>; 17 percent of those questioned did not reply.

Also related to this problem is the question asked of the Moscow voters after the Congress "Are you prepared to help the USSR people's deputies and their deputy activities?" To the greatest degree the voters are ready to help the deputies from territorial districts (24 percent stated their readiness to help constantly and 18 percent in resolving questions of interest to them); to the least degree (5 and 6 percent, respectively) by deputies from the Komsomol and the cooperative organizations. One is struck by the circumstance that from different sides of the question, from 41 percent to 49 percent of the voters found it difficult to answer "as they did not understand how specifically their aid to the deputies could be expressed." This shows the lack of political traditions of interaction between deputies and voters and this is a substantial factor inhibiting the growth of constructive civil activity by the masses and the further development of representative democracy.

**The problem of consensus at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies.** One of the basic tasks of public opinion research in the deputy corps was to determine the opportunities for reconciling the positions of the deputies in the course of the Congress work. Such a focus in the sociological support for the activities of the superior body of power was caused, first of all, by the role and importance of the principle of consensus for a modern political situation. The problem is that the social agreement which previously underlay the political and legal system of our society to a significant degree was dictated from above and reinforced by power-based, coercive measures. The departure from ordered unanimity has led (this is inevitable in the first stage of democratization and glasnost) to a great diversity of voiced opinions. The new consensus of society which should be formed under the conditions of a pluralism of opinions as a result of the free reconciliation of different positions is still in the process of formation. At the same time, a society deprived of its inner agreement cannot resist the administrative-command system. A particular burden in seeking such agreement also rests on the USSR people's deputies.

The questionnaires proposed to the deputies disclosed vectors of "agreement—debate" and "consolidation—confrontation" of the deputies on different problems of society. However, it was particularly interesting in this regard to see how the deputies themselves view the degree of their unity on key questions (Table 3).

**Table 3: Distribution of Replies by Deputies on Key Problems of Social Development, %**

| Problems                                 | Unity Strengthened | There Was Unity and It Remained | Was No Unity and Is None | Unity Weakened | Hard to Answer |
|--|--------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Socioeconomic problems                   | 29                 | 17                              | 36                       | 8              | 10             |
| Democratization of state and social life | 22                 | 17                              | 35                       | 12             | 14             |
| Nationality question                     | 11                 | 6                               | 44                       | 25             | 14             |
| International problems                   | 25                 | 51                              | 3                        | 2              | 19             |
| Activities of new superior state body    | 16                 | 13                              | 34                       | 10             | 27             |

The greatest unity of the deputies (with a significant gap from the other spheres of social life designated in the questionnaire) was noticeable for international questions and the least (also with a large gap) for the problems of internal nationality relations. And while for all questions, with the exception of the nationality one, in the course of the Congress there was a certain drawing together of the positions, on this one point the degree of unity weakened. As for the remaining spheres of national domestic life mentioned in the questionnaire, although the degree of unity among the deputies was greater in the approaches to the solving of these problems than in the area of nationality relations, it nevertheless did not achieve 50 percent. More than a third of the deputies feels that on these questions "there was no unity and is none." Is the ascertained degree of deputy unity sufficient for taking agreed-upon decisions and can it provide the consensus necessary as the basis of a legal standard?

It is interesting to analyze the replies from the delegates to the next question: "Are there Congress decisions which do not conform to your personal position?" Some 56 percent replied affirmatively and 32 percent negatively. Twelve percent found it difficult to answer. In order to evaluate the obtained data (32 percent of the deputies pointed to a conformity of all the Congress decisions to their personal position and 12 percent found it difficult to reply), it must be considered that the decisions of the questions for which voting was carried out at the Congress from 25 May through 2 June (the poll was taken on 2 June) coincided with the proposals of the Congress Presidium. Thus, the position of the deputies from those 32 percent of the deputy corps who did not support a single alternative proposal of the other deputies coincided fully with the position of the Congress Presidium on all points. For this reason, for achieving one or another version of a decision, it was enough, in addition to this stable 32 percent, to obtain the support of a relatively small portion of the deputy corps.

In coming back to the question of what degree of agreement between the deputies is necessary for decision-taking (let us call this constructive consensus), it is clearly possible to draw the following conclusions. In the absence among the deputies of solidarity for an alternative version of a decision, constructive consensus could be slight: the Presidium needed the support of less than 20 percent of those deputies who had certain differences of opinion with the Presidium on disputed questions. For carrying a fundamentally alternative decision at the Congress which ran contrary to the proposals of the Presidium, it was essential to achieve the agreement of a predominant majority among those 60-70 percent of the deputies who did not agree on everything with the Presidium. For this reason, regardless of the rather significant differences of opinion, the decision-taking process at the Congress did not have a protracted nature. However, if the same balance of forces is not maintained at the following congresses of the USSR people's deputies and whereby the Congress Presidium had the stable support from one-third of the deputy corps, then obviously with the existing degree of differences the deputies

would have to make serious efforts to seek out the consensus needed for decision-taking.

For understanding the prospects of reconciling the positions of the deputies and for establishing consensus, of fundamental importance is the ascertaining of their attitude toward the problem of minority rights. The deputies were asked the question "Is it necessary, in your view, to additionally work out procedural guarantees for protecting the rights of a minority of the deputies?" The fundamental nature of this question can be seen from the fact that in the replies to it, there was the broadest spread of positions according to the various republics. For the deputy corps as a whole, the replies were distributed in the following manner: yes for 63 percent; no for 25 percent; difficult to answer 12 percent. Thus, 63 percent of the polled deputies favored working out procedural guarantees to protect the rights and interests of the minority. Is this much or little? And what does the obtained balance of answers mean for the given question of the questionnaire?

First of all, a comparison of these results with the replies of the public to a comparable question<sup>6</sup> indicates that for the deputies a respectful attitude for the opinion of the minority is characteristic to a significantly greater degree (by almost double). Only 32 percent of the population feels that the decisions taken by the deputies should consider the position of the minority (54 percent pointed out that the decisions could be the best only in those instances when they coincided with the position of the majority and 14 percent found it difficult to reply). Here, even among those strata of the public which are most oriented at recognizing the position of a majority, that is, among the representatives of the intelligentsia, only 49 percent of those questioned (comparable with 63 percent of the deputies) felt that in taking decisions it was essential to consider the opinion of the deputies who were in the minority.

Moreover, if we interpret the replies by the deputies to the designated question in the context of analyzing their positions on other questions of the questionnaire, it can be concluded that among that 25 percent of the deputies who were against recognizing the rights of the minority, far from all are consistent supporters of such a viewpoint. Of interest in this regard are the replies to the question "Do you feel it possible to have the uniting of the deputies into groups (during the period of the work of the Congress and afterwards) for working out common proposals on the basis of uniform positions?" We should draw attention to the fact that among the deputies who deny the necessity of a guarantee for the rights and interests of the minority, 58 percent allow the possibility of uniting deputies into groups on the basis of uniform positions. But the recognition of the right of deputies to unite into groups is, in essence, recognition of the right of the group to its own position which could differ also from the viewpoint of a majority of the deputies. Clearly in more than one-half of that 25 percent of the deputies who answered negatively the question of the advisability of considering the rights and interests of the minority,



the well-known stereotype of reducing democracy to the power of the majority was "at work."

As a whole, the attitude of the USSR people's deputies disclosed in the course of the research to the problem of the rights of the minority at the Congress shows that the deputies understand the importance of consensus as an essential base for taking legislative decisions and include consideration of the rights and interests of the minority in the mechanism for seeking consensus.

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The research conducted by the Sociological Service of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the opinions and views of the deputy corps is only the first step to a major and serious work which should be continued at the subsequent congresses. It is indicative that a majority of the deputies (62 percent) stated a desire for the need to study public opinion of the deputy corps in the course of the Congress work using sociological polls.

In the aim of preparing for the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the Congress Sociological Service has conducted a poll for the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the period of the concluding of the work of its second session (343 deputies participated in the poll). One of the tasks of this research was to ascertain the informational needs of the deputies and their expectations from the sociological polls. The research, in particular, showed a very great interest of the parliamentarians in information on public opinion: 82 percent of those questioned would like to know it concerning the situation in the nation, 37 percent was interested in the opinion of the public in the course of the work of the Second Congress and only 2 percent of those questioned replied that they did not need such information.

In considering such high informational requirements of the USSR people's deputies, in the future it would be advisable to involve in the work of the Congress Sociological Service the leading sociological centers of the nation carrying out research on public opinion among the broad strata of the populus. The consolidation of the main sociological forces in the nation on the basis of the Congress Sociological Service and the coordinating of research important for resolving the problems of legislation would be an important step on the path to forming a permanently functioning system of sociological support for the activities of the superior legislative bodies.

Attention should also be drawn to the particular status of sociological information which goes directly to the legislator (particularly during the period of the work of the superior representative bodies). Obviously, such information will be of important legislative significance. This can be seen, in particular, from the results of a poll of the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. To the question "Do you feel sociological data on the state of national public opinion to be an important argument in resolving disputed questions?" a predominant majority of the deputies (74.4 percent) replied affirmatively. Some 15.4

percent of the respondents gave a negative answer and 4.7 percent found it difficult to decide.

The readiness of the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet to take into account sociological data in their legislative activities places very high demands on the objectivity and reliability of the sociological information. The creating of dependable guarantees for the competence and conscientiousness of the research work is possible, in our view, only by increasing the number of sociological centers and services, by carrying out parallel research on a similar subject and providing comparability of the results.

#### Footnotes

1. Respectively, 2,000 and 1,500 respondents were questioned.
2. Participating in the polls were 1,000-1,350 deputies comprising 45-60 percent of the deputy corps. The deputies were acquainted with the results of the first two polls during the period of the Congress work.
3. The scope of the sample was 4,000 persons; leaders of the research: N.I. Betaneli, M.K. Goshkov and N.P. Pishchulin.
4. Some 60 percent of the questioned deputies pointed to the need of having such information during the period of the Congress work.
5. For a comparison: the deputies expected the greatest resistance from the local party committees (8 percent of the respondents), the informal citizen associations (7 percent) and the local economic bodies (5 percent).
6. In the research carried out by the All-Union Center for Studying Public Opinion under the AUCCTU and the USSR Goskomtrud on the results of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the citizens were asked the question "In what instances can the decisions be the best?" and the following scale of replies was proposed: 1) when they coincide with the position of a majority of the deputies; 2) when the decisions being taken consider the position of a minority of the deputies; 3) difficult to reply.

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#### Public Opinion in the Election Campaign

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 90 (signed to  
press 5 Mar 90) pp 36-40

[Article by Olga Mikhaylovna Gubar, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior instructor at the Makeyevka



Construction Engineer Institute; Valeriy Nikolayevich Zytsev, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Makeyevka Construction Engineer Institute; Anatoliy Nikolayevich Saunin, candidate of economic sciences, USSR people's deputy and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] The elections of the USSR people's deputies in 1989, in being carried out for the first time during the years of Soviet power under conditions of relative openness and glasnost and competition among the candidate deputies, had an enormous impact on the public mind. The election campaign and the debates of the candidates, during which polar approaches and views at times clashed over the reality and further development of our society, evoked different viewpoints also among the voters. The appearing "stratification" of public opinion also necessitated the carrying out of concrete research on the processes of its formation.

The main task of the sociologist at present is to keep up on the rapidly developing processes, in renewing the overall concepts and working out and applying new, nonstandard methods of sociological research.

In the course of the election campaign and during meetings with voters after the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, we conducted concrete sociological research on the sociopolitical mind sets of the voters. Here a combined method was employed integrating first-hand observation (during the meetings and assemblies the researchers were immediate participants in them), the nonstandardized interview (talks with voters during breaks and after meetings) and an experiment (studying the response to the adjusting of the election program of the candidate and the language of its exposition). As a total, the authors participated in 120 meetings and they analyzed over 500 statements and 1,027 questions received by A.N. Saunin. The analysis was based on a comparison of the data received during the election campaign and after holding the Congress. What did the research results indicate?

During the first stage of the election campaign, attitudes and views prevailed on the part of the voters expressing the traditional notion of the people's deputy as an intercessor. His main task was seen in having the people's elect defend the interests of the region and the city in the Center and "shake out" additional funds and limits for construction, central gas systems and transport. In line with this at a district meeting, accusations were leveled against the program of A.N. Saunin which differed from the programs of the other candidates in its general political focus, its great attention to the principles of the functioning of the political system in Soviet society as well as to general economic and social questions. The programs of his opponents were chiefly oriented at resolving specific locally important questions and were supported by the party bodies.

For the first period of the election campaign, the following statements were most characteristic: "Your platform is a

conglomerate of the ideas of Popov, Shmelev and Zaslavskaya. What specifically do you intend to do to improve the life of the metallurgical worker or miner?" or "You do not work in production and this you can feel. Your program is not specific. What we need is central gas service in the settlement and the store shelves full." According to our observations, such opinions were expressed by the elective trade union and party workers as well as by those workers who had been put up and supported by the administration as well as pensioners.

On the contrary, the engineer and technical intelligentsia, the students and a certain portion of the workers emphasized that the deputy was being elected not to a local soviet but rather to a higher body of power and for this reason his program should be of a general political nature.

The data of Table 1 show that the process of the election campaign and particularly the debates at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies helped to change the sociopolitical views of the voters and to recognize the necessity of socioeconomic changes as well as the impossibility of resolving local and regional problems in isolation from the general state tasks.

**Table 1: Quantitative Analysis of Statements by Voters at Meetings With People's Deputies, %**

| Content of Statements   | Time of Survey   |                |
|---|------------------|----------------|
|   | Before Elections | After Congress |
| Accusation of abstractness and excessive politicalness of program   | 30.2             | 10             |
| Support for political focus of program  | 20.5             | 29.5           |
| References to the fact that a scientist deputy would not defend the interests of a worker   | 10               | —              |
| Criticism of basic ideas in program related to the principles of separation of power, regional cost accounting and the socialist market | 11.8             | 5.5            |
| Support for basic ideas of program  | 15               | 30             |
| Support for balance of general-state and local problems in program  | 12.5             | 25             |

We, unfortunately, were not able to ascertain a broader spectrum of opinions, as the conditions under which the research was carried out were very specific. Analysis was made of judgments voiced at meetings where, as a rule, there were heard only the extreme viewpoints of the supporters or opponents of the platforms of the deputy candidates. The sociopolitical views of the passive majority could be judged only from the response of the audience to the speech of the speakers.

Similar trends were also reflected by the analysis carried out by us of the questions asked of the deputy. In classifying them we divided them into several large blocks according to subject: economic reform, political

and legal changes, social development, interethnic relations, culture, everyday life, problems of the development of the city and the region, the activities of the deputy and various. Even a purely quantitative comparison of the data makes it possible to conclude what problems the voters at the given moment considered to be priority ones (Table 2).

**Table 2: Quantitative Analysis of Voter Questions in Course of Election Campaign**

| Content of Questions  | In % of Total Number of Questions |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| Economic reform   | 14                                |
| Rational use of resources, problem of raw material exports        | 2                                 |
| Enterprise cost accounting  | 6                                 |
| City cost accounting  | 2                                 |
| Operation of cooperatives   | 4                                 |
| Political and legal reform  | 30                                |
| Activities of CPSU, possibility of establishing multiparty system | 12                                |
| Improving legislation   | 6                                 |
| Holding democratic elections on all levels                        | 4                                 |
| Prospects of perestroika  | 2                                 |
| Human rights  | 2                                 |
| Development of glasnost, problem of press                         | 2                                 |
| Relationship of legislative and executive power                   | 2                                 |
| Social development  | 16                                |
| Social justice, elimination of privileges                         | 12                                |
| Problems of labor placement                                       | 2                                 |
| Medical services  | 2                                 |
| Development of culture, science, art and education problems       | 8                                 |
| Local problems  | 10                                |
| Ecological situation  | 4                                 |
| Gas supply for miner settlements                                  | 2                                 |
| Construction of athletic facilities                               | 4                                 |
| Activities of deputy  | 24                                |
| Various   | 2                                 |

As can be seen from Table 2, around one-third of all the questions concerned the political problems in the development of Soviet society. It was clear that the voters took a very serious attitude toward the notorious "procedural" questions which certain deputies at the Congress had endeavored to depict as unnecessary or secondary. In our meetings, almost one-quarter of all the questions involved the future activities of the deputies. Often the question was raised: "If you remain in the minority, what will you do?" A situation was raised and then the question was asked: "What would your actions be in such an instance?" All of this shows the sufficient maturity of the public mind.

Ethnic relations were virtually not touched upon in the campaign meetings. Clearly, this shows not the absence of problems here but rather that they were not sufficiently felt and not set apart by the community of our region—the Donbass—as priority and primary ones.

An analysis of the questions in the campaign meetings and assemblies after the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies makes it possible also to trace the trend in the changes of public opinion toward political problems (Table 3).

**Table 3: Comparative Analysis of Voter Questions in Campaign Period and After First Congress of People's Deputies, %**

| Content of Questions                       | Time of Conducting Research |                |
|--|-----------------------------|----------------|
|  | Before Elections            | After Congress |
| Goals and course of economic reform        | 13.5                        | 5.7            |
| Political changes                          | 30.5                        | 55.7           |
| Social development                         | 16.8                        | 24.4           |
| Development of culture, science, education | 4                           | 1.4            |
| Regional problems                          | 9.2                         | 7.9            |
| Deputy activities                          | 24                          | 4              |
| Various                                    | 2                           | 0.9            |

The First Congress of USSR People's Deputies undoubtedly became a school for political struggle and had an influence on the state of public awareness. At the post-Congress meetings of A.N. Saunin with the voters, the questions asked showed a more profound and specific understanding of social problems and primarily political ones. For example, a large number of questions concerned the balance of political forces in the nation (14 percent), the structure of power in the USSR (11 percent), a multiparty system (10 percent) and amendments in the USSR and Union Republic Constitutions (around 10 percent). In the post-Congress meetings, they also examined a broader spectrum of problems (the status of women, pension security, the development of nationality relations and the role of the intelligentsia in perestroika). The voters supported the democratic changes being carried out in the nation and took a positive view of the activities of the "parliamentary minority" at the Congress.

The method used by us for investigating the sociopolitical views of the voters has a number of advantages and drawbacks. Among the advantages one can mention above all the speed of collecting information. Observing the campaign meetings of the deputy candidates with the voters and an analysis of verbal and written questions make it possible rather quickly to assess the state of public opinion in the labor collectives, the individual rayons and the city as a whole. A concrete sociological study in the campaign meetings can also be a basis for a rather accurate forecasting of the election results in the election district.

The involvement of a sociologist in the living process of social creativity provides an opportunity to study the processes from within and more from a scholastic theorizing to research on real problems in the development of public opinion.

Among the particular features of the proposed method is also that in being one of the versions of first-hand observation, it makes it possible also to provide first-hand control. Practice has shown that debates involving the deputy and his authorized representatives are an effective means for shaping public opinion. For example, the political platform of A.N. Saunin evoked in the audience (in the second half of the election campaign), as a rule, interest in the general political, economic and social problems. The campaign meetings often turned into political debates. At the same time, there was also a corresponding reaction to the platform of the other candidate in this same electoral district and which basically was concerned with local questions. Those present focused their attention on regional and even personal domestic questions, forgetting that here they were discussing the platform of a candidate USSR people's deputy.

In employing this method, certain psychological impediments are removed since the respondents do not feel themselves to be an object of research. The people are involved in a real life process, they are swept up in what is occurring and, it must be assumed, are more sincere in their appraisals.

Participation in an election campaign involves, as a rule, meetings with various categories of the public and this provides an opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis of the state of public opinion in the production and territorial groups and makes it possible for the candidate to effectively adjust his program.

Among the drawbacks of the given method, one must mention, in the first place, the incomplete representativeness of the results. In drawing conclusions about the state of public opinion at an enterprise or in a rayon, it is essential to incorporate adjustments considering that the campaign meetings are attended by the most active portion of the labor collectives or the public. For this reason, using the given method it is the extreme viewpoints that are studied best. Secondly, in the course of the research it is not possible to obtain objective data about the respondents (age, sex, social status or education). There are also other problems and we continue to work on eliminating these. The obtained positive results do make it possible to hope that our small experience can be beneficial both for the support groups of the candidate people's deputies as well as for scientists in conducting concrete sociological research.

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## SOCIOLOGICAL SUPPORT OF THE ECONOMIC REFORM

### Aging of Labor Force and Its Impact on Employment

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[Article by Vladimir Vasilyevich Neugodov, candidate of economic sciences and doctoral student at the Leningrad Financial and Economic Institute imeni N.A. Voznesenskiy. Our journal has published two articles by him (as co-author): "On the Question of Determining the Age of Industrial Workers" (No 4, 1984) and "'Hot Spots' for Elderly Workers" (No 4, 1989)]

[Text] The impact of the aging of the labor force on the employment of the working-age population is extremely diverse. In a previous article (SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, No 4, 1989), we examined the trends in this process and the patterns in the forming of employment for older age workers. But it is equally important to analyze the effect of aging on employment. The annual retirement of a significant portion of production workers on a pension even with the existing influx of young persons leads to a reduction in overall employment. In those spheres where young persons are not willing to go, the departure of elderly workers can completely disrupt the production processes. Moreover, the aging of the labor force leads to a reduction in the overall level of employment, since the mortality rate in the older age groups of the working-age population is over 4-fold higher than among young and mature workers [1]. The "old" age structures are less labor-saturated, as the elderly workers comprising them are ill longer and more frequently than the representatives of the other age groups. Our calculations carried out from data of the Scientific Research Institute for Labor [2] showed that the morbidity rate with the temporary loss of the capacity to work is 33 percent higher in persons 41-45 years of age than in persons 26-30 years of age; 46 percent for the workers 46-50 years, 57 percent for 51-55 years and 69 percent for 56 years and older.

Employment of older-age persons is characterized by the following particular features. In the first place, this was formed in the wartime and postwar years and to a significant degree reflects the economic structure of that period. Secondly, it is far from optimum from the viewpoint of the efficient utilization of the labor capabilities of the veterans. A significant portion of them is employed in auxiliary jobs (60 percent), manual jobs (from 57 to 85 percent of the individual age groups), lowly skilled (48 percent), as well as hazardous and heavy jobs (45 percent). Thirdly, this employment is extremely conservative and is little subject to external influences both in the professional-sectorial and territorial aspects. According to the data of the research, over 50 percent of the workers over the age of 40 in the event that their section is mechanized would prefer as before to carry out

manual labor, and 22 percent of those 40-49 years and 42 percent of those 50-59 years were categorically against any changes in the nature of their labor [3]. Many leaders, fearing a strengthening of social tension in their production, defer the progressive technological changes for many years until the given contingent has retired on pension.

The aging of the labor force also reduces its territorial mobility. The development of Siberia and the regions of the Far North is going on more slowly than is needed for the nation's economic development. One of the main reasons is the manpower shortage. Experienced and, as a rule, not young workers from the European portion of the nation do not want to move from the inhabited areas. The basic contingent developing the new territories is the young. Thus, according to the data of N. Zhelezko [4], the share of persons over the age of 40 among the builders of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] is just 18 percent for men and 16 percent for women. Of course, it can be said that the development of new territories is primarily a concern of the young. But the migrating of the young from the European part disrupts the manpower structure and impedes the operation of the nation's main industrial regions.

The employment structure of the population under the conditions of an aging labor force creates problems also on the local levels of the individual city and even its rayons. Thus, according to the data of Kiev sociologists, the older age groups in the labor force have settled as close as possible to the place of employment. They are virtually absent outside the limits of 50-minute transport range [5] and this sharply impedes a solution to the questions related to the redistribution of the labor force.

In the regions where the traditional forms of employment are declining, difficulties are also arising in finding jobs for older persons. Recently the press [6] has extensively debated the question of the advisability of closing down the coal mines in the Donbass and moving coal mining to the Kuzbass Region. Regardless of the fact that the latter approach from the economic viewpoint is better (the cost of mining a ton of coal in the Kuzbass is half the price, while labor productivity is three times higher than in the Donbass), nevertheless the implementing of this has collided with serious social problems. First of all, this is the problem of releasing a significant contingent of workers (around 350,000) the basic portion of whom are regular workers over the age of 40. Four ways of emerging from the existing situation have been discussed. 1. To close down the unprofitable coal enterprises in the Ukraine and provide the creation of new jobs where the released workers would be employed after retraining. The realization of this approach would cost 5.6 billion rubles. 2. To relocate approximately 110,000-140,000 persons to the Kuzbass. This approach has been rejected by a majority of the opponents. 3. To continue the mining of coal in the Donbass until the older workers have been pensioned off. 4. Reequip the Donbass coal enterprises and provide them with modern

equipment and continue mining, regardless of the enormous expenditures and the economic inefficiency. There are most supporters for the last two approaches. This is understandable as they comprise the basic portion of the labor force and are the main participants in the discussion. Older people find it difficult to change their habits and give up privileges. This was clearly demonstrated in the statements of the well-known miners V. Antipov and I. Strelchenko: "Change our specialty and retrain? But is such advise acceptable even for the young and partially for middle-aged persons for whom this would be a major readjustment in life. But what does this mean for older, more experienced people, the real treasure of underground coal miners? So now, from the conclusions of the commission (the Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences.—N.V.) it is clear that our labor guard must either give up its customary job and high earnings and retrain or move to other coal basins. Can they really seriously make such proposals?... As for the social aspect of the proposal advanced by the commission, it is simply inhumane." The present-day conditions of management, self-financing and cost accounting dictate new demands. The dynamicness of production and profitability are tied to daily efforts and growing expenditures of labor. Both age and customary high earnings cannot operate as a reason for maintaining loss-producing production.

The aging of the labor force is an impediment not only to scientific and technical progress but also impedes the introduction of the progressive forms of organizing labor and production. A questioning of foremen and other line leaders has shown that 78 percent of them experienced difficulties in incorporating older persons in the brigades. According to the data of our research, collective forms of labor covered 81 percent of the persons under the age of 40 and only 61 percent after.

The transition to intensive forms of production involves a broadening of multishift forms of work. An analysis of employment on this level shows that among the persons 40 years and older, 57 percent work only on the first shift, 30 percent on the first and second and only 13 percent on shifts involving the third as well. Here the share of persons 40-49 years of age in the latter is 95 percent, that is, there are virtually no persons over 50 in it. This, of course, is completely explainable and socially justifiable, however it is very difficult with such a situation to man the second and third shifts in "old" collectives.

The changeover to the principles of self-financing, in involving a greater intensity of labor and a modernizing of the physical plant, requires more efficient and better educated workers and will certainly cause the intense dismissal of precisely the older contingent from production. As the experience of capitalist nations shows, this problem has assumed such an acute nature there that a law has been passed aimed against age discrimination and hiring. Virtually all the major trade unions in contracts with entrepreneurs specifically state the conditions which guarantee employment for older workers. However, the interests of business take the upper hand,

as can be seen from the level of unemployment in the senior age groups. Thus, in West Germany, persons over the age of 45 make up 30.4 percent of all the unemployed and in Japan, 37.8 percent. And unemployment in these groups assumes the most stagnant and extended nature. The introduction of microelectronics into Japanese industry, having caused unemployment, dealt the most serious blow to the older workers. Thus, among the 20-year-olds, 80 percent maintained their employment and 60 percent remained at the same enterprise, while among the 40-year-olds of the 60 percent which avoided dismissal 50 percent were sent to other enterprises, while among the 50-year-olds only 16-17 percent was able to remain on the job and only 2 percent at the former firm [7]. The socialist economy, although it has a different social focus, also is not free of the consequences of technical progress. It is a good thing that this is recognized. Thus, the Decree adopted by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU "On Providing Effective Employment for the Population, Improving the Job Placement System and Strengthening Guarantees for the Workers" [8] states the sound proposal that elderly persons will lose their job first. There are data that in organizing joint enterprises the foreign partners recommend incorporating age restrictions in hiring. Thus, the Soviet-Italian enterprise Sovokrim has introduced an age limit of 30-35 years for specialists and 40-45 years for managers.

In line with what has been said, we must now give some thought to the fate of the released personnel. For them it is essential to provide a range of most suitable jobs and professions if possible with minimum retraining. In the nonproduction sphere an undisputed priority ought to be given to older dismissed workers if they will fill the vacant jobs. It is also essential to be concerned with the retraining of the personnel as well as with the working out of measures to ease their adaptation in the new jobs considering the sociopsychological, physiological and economic features of the older-age contingent.

Regardless of the low labor mobility of the older-age persons, a definite redistribution of employment is still occurring in this contingent. Thus, our research has disclosed the following patterns:

I. Aging leads to the departure of workers from the basic professions into auxiliary ones. This process occurs particularly intensely in worker groups over the age of

50. As a result, the basic professions are growing younger while the auxiliary ones are aging. The auxiliary types of employment, in drawing off experienced, skilled older workers from the main professions, thereby lead to a decline in efficiency, to higher outlays on retraining, to equipment stoppages and, finally, to differences in the socioeconomic effectiveness of main and auxiliary jobs. As an average the failure to complete the length of employment until the officially established pension age is from 5 to 10 years in such key professions in the national economy as lathe operator, drilling machine operator and assembler, and from 10 to 16 years for milling machine operator, mine tunnelers and concrete workers.

II. A substantial redistribution of the labor force due to the moving of elderly workers into hazardous and heavy jobs. According to our data, among the older-age workers who changed jobs, in 43 percent the working conditions worsened. Virtually in all types of hazardous professions, there is an increase in employment for older-age workers (particularly 40-49 years) from other professions. The transfer to hazardous production at such an age causes greater harm than in the event that the person works in this job from his youth. The adaptation process here is extremely complex and extended. According to our data, only 20 percent of such workers remains at their new job. However, this does not mean that the workers remaining have adapted well as 75 percent of them are completely or partially dissatisfied with the new job but do not leave basically because of material considerations. In investigating the particular features of adaptation in older-age persons, we compared a number of characteristics for permanent workers in foundry production and the new arrivals for the mass profession of "sand mixer" which is considered hazardous. It was discovered that only 33 percent had reached average output by the end of the first year and 70 percent by the end of the second, while the remainder never did reach the average level. The sickness rate among the new arrivals was also 13 percent higher than among the permanent employees. If we add to this the morale losses from a change in the main profession, then it becomes clear that solving the problems of employment in hazardous and heavy jobs by using older-age persons does more harm than good.

III. The "aging" of the labor force leads to a departure from professions of mechanized labor into manual professions (see the table).

**Distribution of Older-Age Workers Who Have Changed Jobs According to Degree of Mechanization of Their Labor, %**

| Type of Job at Former Workplace   | Type of Job at New Workplace   |                               |                      |                       |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
|                                   | Manual Low-Skill and Unskilled | Manual High-Skill and Skilled | Mechanized Low-Skill | Mechanized High-Skill |
| Manual low-skill and unskilled    | 90.3                           | 2.2                           | 6.2                  | 1.3                   |
| Manual high-skill and skilled     | 40.5                           | 54.6                          | 4.4                  | 0.5                   |
| Mechanized low-skill              | 58.2                           | 3.5                           | 38.1                 | 0.2                   |
| Mechanized high-skill and skilled | 15.2                           | 22.0                          | 1.2                  | 61.6                  |

As follows from the given data, 62 percent of the workers previously engaged in mechanized low-skill labor and 37 percent of those employed in mechanized high-skill labor replaced this with manual. The reverse "flow" is very insignificant. The progressing aging of the labor force employed in manual types of jobs, largely by transferring older-age workers here from other professions, has a very negative impact on production efficiency. The mechanizing of the labor processes evens out the possibilities for efficient activities by the various age groups and because of this is preferable for the older-age workers. In actuality, in heavy physical jobs (for example, loading and unloading) done by hand, productivity of the older-age workers is significantly lower than in other age groups. The use of simple materials handling equipment makes these differences virtually unimportant.

What explains the impact of aging on employment? Is its negative nature always inevitable? The change in the overall level and structure of employment has occurred as a consequence of natural age processes. The degradation of the organism and the labor potential of a worker under the influence of aging is inevitable. The decline in the overall level of labor activeness is also inevitable. However, this does not mean that this process cannot be affected or its action slowed down. The extensive use of preventive measures of both a general and professional nature can significantly neutralize the negative consequences of aging. It is important to have the proper control over the redistribution of the labor force occurring under the influence of age so that the natural processes occur with the least losses for the individual and society.

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#### Leasing: Obstacles to a Takeoff

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[Article by Nikolay Nikolayevich Alekseyenko, senior science associate at the Institute for Socioeconomic Problems of the Agroindustrial Complex Under the USSR Academy of Sciences (Saratov). Our journal has published his article "Moonlighters: Stereotypes and Reality" (No 6, 1987)]

[Text] The new political thinking and a recognition of the priorities of common human values have made it possible to realize the succession of the objective laws of social development. One of the examples here is the political and economic rebirth of the lease and cooperatives. At the same time, the euphoria has been replaced by caution, irritation and at times complete rejection. Indicative on this level is the attitude toward leasing.

As before, with the approval of the highest party and state levels, mass measures are being carried out to study and generalize experience; at the same time, the rate of spread of leasing is very moderate; the criticism by individual retrograde economic workers who do not wish or are not capable of mastering modern methods is superficial.

Caught in the rut of the old tradition of a monopoly on truth, the view survives that this next economic innovation has been accepted by the masses with unanimous approbation. However, it is not completely correct to identify the driving forces of perestroika with its initiator, that is, with the party.

The grounds for such an opinion lie in the data of the sociological research conducted with the author's participation in the summer of 1989 in Saratov, Ulyanovsk and Voronezh Oblasts.<sup>1</sup> Some 85 percent of the party workers and 81 percent of the workers in the law enforcement bodies consider themselves supporters of leasing. Joining them in terms of the content of replies are the rural teachers and their students (72 and 61 percent respectively). There is a different attitude among the workers in the sphere of material production, that is the workers of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes who have joined leasing collectives (or who have concluded a contract with the administration to lease land, buildings, livestock and equipment) and the rural workers employed under traditional conditions. Only one-quarter of all those questioned (24 percent) favored leasing.

Of course, it is possible to explain the low popularity of leasing by the fact that since ancient times the peasantry has been one of the conservative forces in society. If this thesis is adopted, then it is essential to define the "reform" wing which is in favor of developing the lease. In our sample, it was represented by a group of respondents from the nonproduction sphere (Tables 1, 2).

**Table 1: Assessment by Respondents of Development of Leasing and Cooperatives, %**

| Content of Replies  | Social Groups of Respondents       |                            |                                 |                          |
|---|------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
|   | Workers in Agricultural Production |                            | Workers in Nonproduction Sphere |                          |
|   | Total                              | Including Workers Under 19 | Total                           | Including Schoolchildren |
| Lease, contract and cooperative are a temporary thing, another campaign | 24                                 | 12                         | 25                              | 17                       |
| Lessees and cooperative members can hire workers                        | 37                                 | 17                         | 40                              | 39                       |
| Income of the lessees must be limited                                   | 16                                 | 10                         | 30                              | 33                       |
| Respect must be shown for leasing in the countryside                    | 24                                 | 22                         | 49                              | 59                       |
| We must repeat the elimination of the kulaks                            | 30                                 | 7                          | 33                              | 30                       |

**Table 2: Assessment of Social Consequences of Leasing and Cooperatives, %**

| Content of Replies                         | Social Groups of Respondents       |                            |                                 |                          |
|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
|  | Workers in Agricultural Production |                            | Workers in Nonproduction Sphere |                          |
|  | Total                              | Including Workers Under 16 | Total                           | Including Schoolchildren |
| The life of the people will improve        | 18                                 | 17                         | 59                              | 58                       |
| The nation as a whole will become stronger | 18                                 | 15                         | 59                              | 64                       |
| The number of poorly-off will increase     | 23                                 | 12                         | 38                              | 28                       |
| There will be less charity and kindness    | 29                                 | 15                         | 39                              | 29                       |
| Crime will increase                        | 35                                 | 17                         | 48                              | 32                       |
| There will be more stingy people           | 39                                 | 22                         | 53                              | 42                       |

The data are convincing that the "reformers are more conservative than the conservatives." Here, in my view, the position of the rank-and-file worker is more logical and consistent. Beginning from those now distant years of the "great change," our peasantry has constantly been subjected to various experiments. Just recently, there have been intensive labor collectives, the Ipatov method, working without a schedule order, the collective contract and numerous forms of internal production cost accounting which have never been taken to their logical conclusion. And now the lease has been offered up to take control of the "office." And this has been done after widely broadcast assurances of independence, self-management and self-financing. It is quite natural that among a certain group a persistent, one might say on the level of a prejudice, rejection of innovation has arisen.

The forming of the leasehold subdivisions is being carried out under administrative pressure. Thus, of the five proposed suggested answers to the question "Why did you yourself enter the lease collective?" 36 percent of the respondents chose the reply "There was no other way out, they insisted" and 17 percent chose "The leaders persuaded us." We already know how the peasantry was "persuaded" during collectivization and we can see what one-sided conditions are being offered for the lease at present.

Some 53 percent of the lessees and 69 percent of the workers in ordinary brigades pointed to the possibility of greater earnings as a priority enticement in orienting the worker to a lease. Is not this difference (69 minus 53) the first indicator of the disappointment in the possibilities of a lease to provide a worthy wage? In selecting alternative forms for the organization of labor whereby it would be possible to earn enough to "live well," a majority of those questioned in both categories referred to "their own private farm in expanding it" (37 and 32 percent, respectively).

The following data can be considered a sort of indicator of the rejection of leasing: only 7 percent of the rural workers wanted to see their children as lessees.

Yet another declaration without the corresponding legal support gives rise to the expectation of negative consequences, including another drive to eliminate the kulaks (around 1/3 of the lessees and 42 percent of those questioned from ordinary brigades).

Let us add to this the neglected social sphere in the countryside, the new increase in the cost of agricultural equipment and fertilizers and the stability of purchase prices which has caused perplexity. Nor should we forget the low level of mechanization in this sector. And hence the programmable increase in the intensity of live labor

in a lease and the new quality of the economic responsibility of the lessee for his activity the result of which is not mythical but real bankruptcy. Consequently, the conservatism of our peasantry looks somewhat different than before.

The position of the respondents representing the non-production sphere is more contradictory. According to the data of Table 2, it is possible to judge a tendency toward a psychological rejection of the lease. In actuality, can one expect that someone who anticipates bad social consequences to be a sincere supporter of the lease? This is a far from rhetorical question.

In obeying the administrative-command system, this contingent of persons questioned in their predominant majority favored a lease. But the key point here is not that the lease is objectively viewed as a management method. The main thing is the idea has been sanctioned "from above" and there must be an adequate response "from below." Such a policy of the bureaucracy has already become classic. We might merely recall the fate of the reforms proposed on the macrolevel (1965 and 1979) and the innovations on the microlevel such as the Shchekino method and the brigade contract in construction. After the "unanimous approval," the bureaucracy curtailed them.

Something similar is now happening here. Only the methods are different. From the viewpoint of the bureaucracy, a very convenient formula has been found for the lease, an internal production one. In coinciding in form or, more accurately, being presented as a lease, it, in its economic content, cannot rise higher than the internal production cost accounting. In other words, if a lease is capable of making the worker the boss, the internal production version of it is designed for nothing more than a conscientious executor. To keep the worker in his given pose, having established one's own necessity—this is the primary task of the bureaucracy. And in this context the expectation of negative consequences from the spread of the lease is the expectation of the loss of power by this bureaucracy. And an ordinary worker here can spot the double-dealing position. In determining the factors which turn them against the lease, the proposed hint "the leadership in words favors the lease but in actuality is against it" gained 27 percent of all the replies. Among construction workers this opinion is even more starkly expressed (54 percent). In this context, the position of the rural construction workers is interesting. In answering the question about the benefit of leasing the equipment and transport to the brigade, 39 percent of the workers in the construction brigades agreed with the proposed answer in the questionnaire "this is an attempt by the administration to shift its concerns to the brigade."

In other words, the position of this social group can be explained by the same rejection. The difference is that an ordinary worker views a lease as something "bureaucratic," while the official looks like a "bureaucratic man." Like a robot, he "urges on the leading line" until

the complete discrediting of the idea. And the attempt at introducing the internal production lease (like, incidentally, all the innovations preceding it on the brigade level) is the best confirmation of this.

At the present stage in the development of the lease, its social base cannot be considered sound either in the basis or in the superstructure. At the same time, there is a definite contingent of workers which can conditionally be termed the "hope group." These are persons who have affirmed their positive attitude toward the lease and want to obtain a plot of land for independent farming. This group is rather representative (24 percent of those questioned). Almost 1/2 of them (11 percent) wants to purchase land. The second half has agreed to the lease or to obtain land for use without a time limit. On the sociodemographic level the "hope group" is in the age of 25-39 years. Characteristically, in comparison with the general group of persons questioned, the representatives of this group more frequently have relatives with whom they could work on a family contract (53 percent against 25 percent). In this same group, 27 percent (4-fold more than for the entire sample) is those who foresee a continuation of their peasant way of life, that is, see their direct offspring as lessees or farmers.

Consequently, an active social policy should be focused on the family and kinship relations in the countryside.

Now about the views of young workers and schoolchildren concerning a lease. The former have freed themselves of the social pessimism of their parents. The negative views acquired in school are being "disassembled." A definite misunderstanding of the problem is related to poorly organized general economic education.

The research has disclosed one other pertinent aspect. This is related to the stereotypes of thinking, and without overcoming these we will find it difficult to implement what we have planned. Some 44 percent of the questioned rural workers feel that "a lease is a contract, while cooperatives are a departure from socialism." Such a perception must be taken into account.

As is known, perestroyka has not meant an end to the administrative-command system. Rather the reverse. At the same time, as yet there is no real guarantee for the irreversibility of perestroyka itself. In undergoing its agonies, the system will quickly find the ways and means for making peace with the "lower levels." A clear example of this is the position of the trade union leaders after the miners' strike. From the obedient appendage of the apparatus, they adroitly turned themselves into the supporters of justice and the defenders of worker interests, and primarily in the area of fighting against the economic innovations.

Research again persuades us that the fate of a lease will follow a difficult and contradictory path. However, for its development a serious normative and legal basis is being established in the form of a package of legislative enactments. The foreseen democratization of economic



life as well as the deepening reform of the political system will also be a guarantee for the irreversibility of the planned changes.

#### Footnotes

1. Approximately 3,000 persons were polled: over 270 rural schoolchildren in graduating classes; around 130 rural teachers; 1,872 kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers; around 430 rural construction workers; 360 party workers and 170 MVD workers.

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### APPLIED RESEARCH

#### Antisocial Manifestations in Youth: Attempt at Regional Forecast

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[Article by Aleksandr Yuryevich Arshavskiy, science associate at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Systems Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Andrey Yanovich Vilks, candidate of legal sciences and department chief at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR MVD. This is the first time they appear in our journal]

[Text] What is today's youth like? What do we like in them? What causes concern? What has provided the greatest troubles? How will the social portrait of the younger generation change in the future? These and other questions often arise in investigating various aspects of the youth problem. The questions are complicated and the possible answers to them are not simple.

Regardless of the succession in social experience and the rather strong link between the different groups of the population, inherent to the youth have always been specific forms of activity, an unique functional environment and their own elements of subculture. Within the given structures, positive experience is not always accepted and socially negative ties, asocial standards and values become established and reinforced and the environment of young people at times has a criminal overtone.

In line with this, in analyzing various social phenomena among the youth, the question is validly raised: Can the researchers provide a reliable forecast for its development and protect us from the errors of the past [1]? Here it must also be considered that we have fallen behind in assessing the causes of crime [2, p 49].

One of the consequences of such errors has been a definite immaturity in the moral notions of the youth, a low level of legal awareness and this has brought about the spread of antisocial phenomena among the youth, an increase in the number of actions with a heightened

social danger and so forth [3, 4]. The ideological apparatus, the educational institutions and the law enforcement bodies have not been prepared for an effective and ongoing response to the social, political and economic initiatives of the youth or for preventing antisocial manifestations. What has prevented the establishing of a dialogue and preventive work against socially negative processes?

In our view, one of the insufficiently worked out links in the given causal chain is the virtual absence of forecasts for the development of the youth subculture and its countercultural formations. In the research on the illegal behavior of juveniles and young persons one rarely encounters a profound analysis of the state or a determining of the development trends of social phenomena and the factors related to crime, including drug addiction, substance abuse, prostitution or other social anomalies. The analysis of negative trends among the youth does not always reflect those methodological and procedural principles which have been worked out by the theory of sociology and criminology.

The insufficient elaboration of forecasts and a defining of social policy in terms of the youth and the trends of antisocial manifestations among it has been felt in the preparation and implementation of the decrees, decisions, plans and recommendations to combat the violators of the law among adolescents and young persons. Thus, preventive measures were not promptly worked out against socially deleterious factors and conditions were not created for their realization.

In 1988, with the participation of the authors, an attempt was made at working out a forecast on a regional level<sup>1</sup> for the development of antisocial manifestations, including crime among adolescents and the young. The material can be of interest, at least, from two viewpoints. In the first place, for using and improving the approach of the authors to regional forecasting. We feel that similar forecasts should be worked out in all the republics, krais and oblasts and large cities. Secondly, for using the results of the forecast in working out the corresponding plans for the social and economic development of a region and in preparing programs to combat various antisocial manifestations.

The forecasted period covers 1989-1995 (a medium-term forecast). This is more reliable in comparison with the long-range forecast worked out for the year 2005 or 2015. Moreover, a medium-term forecast can be adjusted more effectively and corrections made in the decisions being taken.

The trends in the development of antisocial manifestations and crime among the youth were determined on the basis of constructing a model of a search forecast considering the ongoing influence in the future of the main socially significant factors which have caused the existing "set" growth rates or decline in the level of criminally punishable actions and other infractions.

The elaboration of the forecast model included the use of the following groups of forecasting methods: a) forecast extrapolation using the method of fitting the dynamic series (probability modeling)<sup>2</sup>; b) the use of expert (intuitive) methods of assessing and predicting the change in a number of socially significant determinants of crime.

An analysis of the data from the dynamic series of the crime rate among the examined contingent in 1981-1987 shows definite unfavorable trends:

- A rise in particularly dangerous crimes by more than ¼ with the increase rate of criminally punishable actions of adolescents of double that for the analogous indicator as a whole. The crime rate of adolescents per 10,000 of the population increased by 1.8-fold (from 4.2 to 7.6). Here it must be considered that the share of persons in the age group of 14-17 years over this period declined in the structure of the region's population;
- A rise of 1.5-fold in the absolute number of persons 14-17 years of age involved in criminal liability;
- A large number of persons (over 1,500) who committed socially dangerous actions before reaching the age of criminal liability and a significant number of persons (around 10,000) brought to the internal affairs bodies for various infractions.

In the opinion of experts, it is assumed that in 1989-1995 in the region we cannot expect substantial changes in the factors which determine the criminal and other antisocial actions committed by juveniles or young persons. The negative trends have been shaped under the impact of factors of an economic and sociodemographic nature and their influence is significant not only in retrospect but will also be maintained over the entire forecasting period.<sup>3</sup> Among the main economic factors which influence the growth of crime among the youth, we chose one indicator for the change in the standard of living of the urban population: the amount of the monthly earnings and its extent of dispersion (the difference between the maximum and minimum amounts in a sectorial breakdown); the availability of consumer durables, the accessibility of commodities, consumption priorities and so forth were not taken into account in the forecast.

Over the base period, the monthly wage rose by 15.6 percent (from 179 rubles a month in 1981 to 207 rubles a month in 1987), and its extent of dispersion by 36.1 percent (from 61 rubles in 1981 to 83 rubles in 1987).<sup>4</sup> Judging from the trends of these indicators, the growth of monthly wages will be accompanied by a more rapid rise in the amount of its extent of dispersion, with the former restraining an increase in youth crime and the latter increasing it.

The low level of earnings characteristic particularly of the young group in the population creates unsatisfactory start-up conditions and this is felt in the forming of social guidelines and in the choice of the methods for struggling for material prosperity [5].

The increase in the crime rate during the base period among minors in Moscow has occurred against a background of changes in the sociodemographic composition of the population. Thus, the mechanical increase in the population has exceeded its natural increase by 3.87-fold and was 79.4 percent of the total increase in the city's population. An unstable situation has arisen in the area of establishing sociocultural traditions and forming a positive image of life. The recently adopted administrative measures to limit the mechanical increase in Moscow's population have not only not produced the desired result but, on the contrary, have led to a decline in the social status of persons arriving in Moscow from other regions. As a result, their perception of their social position has been exacerbated. The negative response to a reduction in social status has been expressed in the increase in antisocial actions in this group. Such social instability in the given category of the population over the long run will be a sort of base for increasing the number of juvenile infractions.

In the category also of sociodemographic factors is the stability of the family as a social institution. The rather large number of divorces (over the designated period over 300,000 of them were registered) has led to an increase in the number of incomplete families and, as a consequence, to infractions among minors. Over this period, the number of divorces declined: from the 44,600 registered in 1981 to 40,900 in 1987, however the influence of this factor on the rise in infractions will be felt over the extent of the entire forecast period.

The influence of the above-mentioned factors on the increase in the number of infractions among minors is partially compensated for by the development of a network of nonschool institutions which provide recreation for the students. In 1981-1987, the number of persons attending nonschool facilities increased from 247,300 persons to 369,100 persons for the compared group of institutions or from 277 persons to 345 persons per 1,000 students (together with the students of the PTU [vocational-technical school]). But it would be premature to speak about the permanent effect of this factor on reducing the number of infractions.

The listed factors are only the "upper" layer of economic and sociodemographic factors influencing the social state among minors. For now it has not been possible to disclose the more significant and "deeper" factors due to the absence of qualitatively and quantitatively detailed social statistics. The authors are hoping that the questions raised in the article will make others aware of the need to establish in Moscow a service of social statistics including also criminal statistics. This will provide a more reliable base for the forecasts. The use of the paired correlation method has shown that in keeping the present trends for solving youth social problems in the future, the increase in crime will be within the limits of 3 percent.

In working out the model for the crime rate of minors and young persons and for the development of its basic

determinants, an expert poll was conducted of persons directly employed in the sphere of the fight against crime. In the first stage of the research, as experts we used workers from the criminal investigation personnel and inspectorates for juvenile affairs who had worked in the internal affairs bodies for over 10 years and, consequently, had great professional qualifications and significant experience.

The method of the expert poll proposed an assessment of 27 factors operating at present according to a 7-point scale as well as the expected trends for the change of their influence in the future (through 1995).

Considering the analysis of the time dynamic series for the number of minors committing crimes, forecast models were worked out for the trends in the change in the number of juveniles held for criminal liability in 1989-1995. According to the preliminary estimates, under the condition of maintaining the influence of the main socially significant factors, the trend in the crime dynamics can grow.

According to the estimates of the experts, two out of three crimes could be prevented with the proper and prompt activities of the special preventative bodies. This is determined by the fact that for a predominant majority of the minors and young persons committing crimes there is a characteristic gradual and growing deterioration in their behavior over a period of several months. Over one-half of the adults who involved juveniles in antisocial conduct had previous convictions or had been described negatively at the place of residence. Naturally, they should have been in the zone of the preventative or on-the-spot actions. Prior to the involving of the juveniles in the commission of crimes, these persons drew them into antisocial conduct, however real legal measures were not applied in 90-95 percent of the cases [6, p 31].

The forecast trends in crime and other antisocial manifestations among the youth may not be realized if more attention is paid to prompt action for minors who leave their studies and are not employed. According to the expert evaluation, there is around 1 percent such minors in the age group of 14-17 years, but they produce from 5 to 6 percent of all the juvenile crime.

In line with the change in the social structure of the minors with the more rapid growth of PTU students, it is possible that there will be a further increase in the number of the latter in crime. An increase is also forecast in the share of schoolchildren and students with a simultaneous decline in the share of those employed.

In the long run, we can expect a trend for recidivist crime to a significant degree to be made up (up to 1/3) of persons convicted or held criminally liable when still a minor. This is caused by the following:

—The persistent influence of antisocial elements (including convicted minors or those whose sentence

has been deferred) on other minors and their acquaintance with the criminal subculture;

—The forming of mixed groups with the involvement of adult criminals (the official level of the instituting of criminal proceedings against adults who have involved minors in criminal or other antisocial activities for a number of years has not corresponded to the actual picture of this phenomenon);

—The mass acquaintance of minors with petty speculation, substance abuse, games of chance, sexual dissoluteness (to a significant degree under the influence of the model of the modern way of life and the image of a young persons created by the foreign mass information media) and by public opinion which in a number of instances is tolerant of these forms of conduct.

Among the analyzed factors we isolated the main ones which, in the opinion of the experts, presently have a negative impact on the antisocial manifestations among the minors and youth. In the future, a substantial change in them for the better is not to be expected.

1. Virtually all the experts (95 percent) established a significant negative influence, that is, a high degree of distribution and criminogenic potential of poorly-off families. In the period up to 1995, a significant drop is expected in the frequency of such families (Fig. 1). At the same time, for the forecasted period the degree of influence of poorly-off families and their criminogenic activities will remain, as was pointed out by a majority of the experts, on a very high level.

2. A high frequency in anomalies of the juvenile psyche will become a consequence of this negative influence. Previously conducted research disclosed a direct link between the crime level in minors and the frequency of their mental disorders (Fig. 2).

The expert poll conducted showed that at present a majority of the Moscow respondents note the high frequency of the given category of juveniles. In the period up to 1991, virtually no decline is expected in the share of the given category of individuals. Tentatively, only by 1993 can there be an insignificant decline (up to 10 percent) in the share of minors with mental anomalies.

3. In an analogous manner, the experts assessed the frequency of the number of juveniles consuming drugs and toxic substances as well as alcoholic beverages. A trend has been noticed for an increase in the share of the given category of individuals by 1995 (Fig. 3). This clearly has been caused by a drop in the number of minors using drugs with a simultaneous rise in the number of substance abusers. The new practices for realizing antialcohol legislation by the trade organizations and public dining facilities also, in the opinion of experts, can cause an increase in the share of alcoholic beverage consumers.




Fig. 1. Assessment of states and trends for the frequency of the number of poorly-off families in the 1989-1995 period. Scale of estimates of the influence of factors on antisocial manifestations of the youth: -3—significantly negative; -2—definite negative; -1—insignificant negative; 0—virtual absence; 1—insignificant positive (anticriminogenic) as warning; 2—definite positive; 3—substantial positive.




Fig. 2. Assessment of trends in frequency of number of minors with mental anomalies; a—significant; b—medium; c—insignificant.

4. There was also a strong impact of antisocial elements and organized criminal groups on minors (Fig. 4). During the period up to 1991, a certain decline in this level is expected, however with the former (and even increased) scale of criminal activities. As a consequence, by 1995, the negative influence of previously convicted and other antisocial groups as well as organized criminal groups to a certain degree will rise, at the same time not reaching the level of the end of the 1980s. We should also notice the ineffectiveness of the existing legal education (Fig. 5).

5. A majority (90 percent) of the experts assessed the influence of the informal youth associations with an antisocial bent. By 1991 and 1995, they expect a certain drop in the influence of the given groups (by 10-15 percent). Also expected is a reorientation of certain informal groups with an antisocial focus into prosocial ones or with a socially neutral orientation. At the same time, new trends will also occur in the informal movement with the appearance of new varieties of groups. This will cause not only their consolidation but also conflict relations and group violations of public order.

The expert poll also showed that the greatest problem for the law enforcement bodies will be the informal groups formed along territorial lines for combating other similar associations both in Moscow as well as in the other cities and regions of the nation.

Just how realistic are the basic trends in the increase in the crime rate and other antisocial manifestations among the youth in the forecasted period? We have pointed out that the forecast is of a probability nature. The degree of its realization depends upon the situation in the social and economic spheres of the designated region.




Fig. 3. Estimate of trends for the frequency of young persons using narcotics and toxic substances and alcoholic beverages: a—significant; b—medium; c—insignificant.




Fig. 4. Estimate of the degree of influence of criminal elements and organized criminal groups on the antisocial manifestations among the youth. Scale of estimates of the influence is shown in Fig. 1.

First of all, this is related to a substantial improvement in the standard of living of the population. This comes down to not only an increase in the average monthly wages. Of a much greater criminogenic impact is the increase in the extent of dispersion between the incomes received by the different social groups of the public.

The soviets, the financial bodies and social security institutions should find ways for improving the material standard of poorly-off strata in the society, in particular, younger persons. In the given instance, this would solve the problem of reducing the extent of dispersion in the standard of living and the real incomes between the best-off social groups of the population and groups which are now below the level of official poverty. To a definite degree, the atmosphere of social tension could be reduced and the probability of criminal outbursts localized.

At the same time, in the near future, the problem should be solved of providing the region's population with accessible and high-quality consumer goods. It must not be forgotten that the dissatisfaction of demand with a certain standard of living is a major criminogenic factor which forms distorted value orientations and these subsequently are often realized in illegal forms of behavior, particularly among the youth.

The next area for correcting the bad forecast is involved with an improvement in the sociodemographic situation. It is essential to substantially reduce the level of migration and completely abandon the influx of out-of-towners in individual sectors and facilities of the national economy concentrated in Moscow. In the near future we must review the question of moving a number of institutions of learning (PTU and technical schools) where in a predominant majority minors from other regions of the nation are studying.




Fig. 5. Estimate of state of legal education in institutions of learning and the prospects of its development in 1989-1995. Scale of estimates of influence is shown in Fig. 1.

In stabilizing the demographic situation, a significant reserve remains in increasing the educational potential of the family. It would be advisable to prepare and adopt interdisciplinary programs on the family and childhood for Moscow and Moscow Oblast in following the example of analogous programs worked out in the Baltic Republics. The saving of money for the support and raising of children and the strengthening of the family would be paid for at an incomparably dearer price in the future.

Under present-day conditions, it is becoming particularly unforgivable to delay in resolving the question of labor employment for minors and young persons. How can they get the money for purchasing a favorite thing if there are virtually no well-paid jobs? Where are jobs to be found for those who have just returned from special (closed) training and educational facilities, educational-labor colonies or medical-labor preventoria? It is precisely this category of young persons which comprises a reserve for increased crime.

For the unfavorable trends toward increased crime, promising adjustments can be made by carrying out the program of the Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 4 August 1989 "On a Decisive Strengthening of the Fight Against Crime" and by the temporary crime prevention committees established in the nation.

At present, a national program is being worked out to combat crime. This is a task of great political and social significance and it can be carried out with the aid of all the involved institutions and organizations as well as specialists concerned with the problem of the raising of the youth and preventing antisocial manifestations. We feel that certain ideas in the article would be useful in a discussion of the given problem.

#### Footnotes

1. Moscow was chosen as the region of investigation. The given indicators characterize only the given region.

2. In calculating the parameters of the regression equations, the programs of A.A. Ratnikov and M.N. Passonin were used.

3. The importance of the influence of the factors was determined on the basis of dispersion analysis.

4. Here and below the statistical data and calculations from them have been taken from the reference "Moskva v tsifrah" [Moscow in Figures] (1986, 1988).

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### Dynamics of Way of Life for Rural Population

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[Text] One of the most realistic quantitative models for the standard of living is the time budget and the trends in its change rather reliably reflect the dynamics in the forms of human activity. Field research conducted by us (in 1975-1976 and 1986-1987 in Novosibirsk Oblast) was aimed at studying such dynamic processes in the life of the rural population using the time budget as the source of information about the way of life.

Survey-80 was carried out in the same aggregate of settlements as had been selected in preparing Survey-70

as representative for Novosibirsk Oblast and this oblast, in turn, in terms of its main indicators was close to the averages for Western Siberia. The principles of forming the sample aggregate and its dimension (around 730 persons still working, pensioners, students as well as those employed in housework and the private subsidiary farm) were the same in both surveys.

In order to question at least minimal groups of workers in the nonproduction sphere, a quota sample was used and this led to a reduction in the number of workers in material production (and primarily agriculture). However, the trends in the change of the "sectorial" structure in the sample and general aggregates corresponded to one another. The immediate choice of persons for the poll was made using a mechanical sample in the farm book.

The surveys were organized in the same manner, and were carried out in the same months (in November-December and in June) using close instrumentarium, method of filling out the questionnaires and the accounting of time. This was predominantly the filling out of the questionnaire in the words of the respondent and the retrospective questioning on the use of time on the day before. To a small degree we used the method of having the respondent fill out the questionnaire with subsequent supervision. The poll was conducted at the place of employment, study and residence. Preference was given to the workplace. From each respondent we took the daily budget (for a day off or workday). A portion of the respondents (teachers, physicians and students) made the count over 2 days.

The questionnaires for the winter and summer in Survey-70 were the same, while in Survey-80 they were partially repeated and partially supplemented one another, basically in the block of evaluation questions.

The given article presents the results of an analysis of the questionnaire-budget data on the working rural population. The independent task was not posed of analyzing the dynamics of the standard of living and we paid attention only to those characteristics of the workers and the conditions of their life which are traditionally linked to a change in the use of time.

The research has shown that over the decade (the 1970s-1980s), the average age of the population increased, the proportional amount of persons under the age of 30 at the same time virtually did not change (see Table 1). The share of those giving birth in the given village declined somewhat, while there was a rise in the proportional amount of persons arriving from other places. This was the result of reducing the number of small villages and increasing the share of the population living in large population points. The share of persons arriving from the city remained virtually as before. There were more family members among those questioned. The average size of the family declined somewhat and the average number of persons working and children changed in the same direction. The decline in the proportional amount of large families (5 persons and more) was the steepest (from 33 to 24 percent).

**Table 1: Change in the Sociodemographic Characteristics and Living Conditions of the Questioned Working Rural Population**

| Indicators   | 1975 (n=571) | 1986 (n=574) | +     |
|--|--------------|--------------|-------|
| Men  | 42.6         | 40.8         | -1.8  |
| Women  | 57.4         | 59.2         | +1.7  |
| Average age, years   | 37/6         | 38.1         | +0.5  |
| Share of persons married, %  | 82.9         | 88.1         | +5.2  |
| Average family size, persons   | 3.98         | 3.68         | -0.3  |
| Average number of working family members   | 2.09         | 1.99         | -0.1  |
| Average number of children in family   | 1.31         | 1.25         | -0.06 |
| Average number of completed grades of school   | 6.8          | 8.2          | +1.4  |
| Share of persons not having complete secondary education, %                                  | 79.3         | 55.6         | -23.7 |
| Not having special education, %  | 33.0         | 24.8         | -8.2  |
| Having specialized secondary and higher education, %   | 21.0         | 30.0         | +9.0  |
| Share (in %) living in villages with poorly and moderately developed economic infrastructure | 35.1         | 27.9         | -7.2  |
| Settlements with medium and highly developed economic infrastructure                         | 57.6         | 65.4         | +7.8  |
| Share (in %)   |              |              |       |
| Of indigenous inhabitants  | 29.7         | 26.4         | -3.3  |
| Persons coming from city   | 14.1         | 13.3         | -0.8  |
| Persons coming from countryside  | 52.2         | 57.2         | +5.0  |
| Wages, rubles  | 118.5        | 162.8        | +44.3 |
| Per capita monetary income (aside from PSP), rubles  | 77.2         | 100.8        | +23.6 |
| Those living in free-standing house, %   | 56.2         | 34.2         | -22.0 |
| Having (%):  |              |              |       |
| water system   | 24.7         | 40.9         | +16.2 |
| sewage system  | 10.5         | 26.7         | +16.2 |
| central heating  | 15.7         | 28.9         | +13.2 |
| hot water  | 4.2          | 6.6          | +2.4  |
| bath, shower   | 9.2          | 16.7         | +7.5  |
| gas or electric stove  | 76.1         | 84.7         | +8.6  |
| refrigerator   | 56.4         | 95.3         | +38.9 |
| washing machine  | 94.7         | 93.0         | -1.7  |
| vacuum cleaner   | 18.3         | 47.4         | +29.1 |
| sewing machine   | 79.0         | 65.8         | -13.2 |
| television set   | 66.5         | 98.4         | +31.9 |
| tape recorder  | 16.8         | 50.3         | +33.5 |
| library  | 27.9         | 39.2         | +11.3 |
| motor vehicle  | 8.6          | 21.7         | +13.1 |
| private subsidiary plot [PSP]  | 88.8         | 88.4         | -0.4  |

**Table 1: Change in the Sociodemographic Characteristics and Living Conditions of the Questioned Working Rural Population (Continued)**

| Indicators            | 1975 (n=571) | 1986 (n=574) | ±    |
|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|------|
| Intentions for PSP, % |              |              |      |
| get started           | 2.1          | 3.3          | +1.2 |
| expand                | 9.2          | 14.2         | +5.0 |
| leave same size       | 50.8         | 55.4         | +4.6 |
| reduce                | 17.8         | 10.7         | -7.1 |
| not have at all       | 9.8          | 3.6          | -6.2 |

The share of persons employed in agriculture declined. The educational level rose noticeably. The proportional amount of those not having a complete secondary education and not having vocational training declined by 1/4. There was a substantial rise in the share of workers having diplomas for a specialized secondary and higher education. The average skill category of the workers rose from 3.8 to 4.

The definite attention which has been given to the social development of the countryside, the capital investments by the state and the farms, the labor and concerns of the rural inhabitants themselves could not help but tell on certain changes in their living conditions. First of all, it must be pointed out that housing conditions improved both by the construction of fully equipped housing by the kolkhozes, sovkhoses and other organizations as well as by individual construction.

With a 30-percent increase in average monthly wages over the 10 years, the per capita monetary income of the families increased by 30 percent (not counting the income from the private plots). However, the change in the real income is difficult to assess without a knowledge of the cost of living index. We would point out that the average wages of women (143 rubles) as before noticeably lagged behind the wages of men (191 rubles). In 1975, this was 67 percent of the men's wages and in 1986, 75 percent.

Over the past period the supply of the rural families with consumer durables improved. There was a particularly substantial increase in the number of refrigerators and TV sets, and the share of families having vacuum cleaners, a library and sports equipment rose rapidly. The number of families with cars increased rather quickly. Comparison with data of surveys of the urban population shows a definite drawing together of the material prosperity of the urban and rural population.

The share of those having a private plot or private subsidiary plot (PSP) virtually did not change, if one has in mind any private plots including those used only for growing potatoes. The number of cows declined somewhat on the private plots with a rise in the number of pigs and during the summer season also sheep, goats and poultry. There was also a change in attitude toward the private plot by the inhabitants themselves with the share of persons questioned voicing a desire to reduce or not to

have a private plot at all dropped by 1/2 with a noticeable rise (from 11 to 17 percent) in those desiring to start up or expand the plot.

In assessing their own material situation, 10 percent of the workers considered themselves as someone who in practical terms need not refuse themselves anything, 42 percent felt that as a whole they had enough money, 39 percent of those questioned felt that they had enough money for just the most essential, while 8 percent experienced an acute need for money even for the most necessary needs.

From the viewpoint of settlement conditions, we must note the improvement in transport services, although in the villages there are no hard surfaced streets as before (except Novosibirskiy Rayon). New children's preschool institutions, a children's athletic school and the affiliate of a music school had been established. In a number of villages there was an increase in the list of domestic services provided to the population, and the number of telephones, particularly apartment, rose. A water supply operating around-the-clock had been provided in almost 1/2 of the surveyed settlements.

The fixed productive capital of agriculture in 1976-1985 almost doubled, and calculated per worker rose by 2.3-fold with an increase in the energy-to-labor ratio in basic production from 25 to 41 hp on the kolkhozes and from 29 to 46 hp on the sovkhoses, and by 1.6-fold calculated per 100 hectares of planted area. Electric power consumption rose by 2.5-fold on the kolkhozes and by 2-fold on the sovkhoses, including, by 1.5- and 3-fold, respectively, for nonproduction needs. It was expected that the changes in mechanizing of labor would lead to a decline in the extensive amount of working time or to a rise in the production of agricultural product. However, the indicators of agricultural production over this period did not change sufficiently and not always for the better.

The per capita volume of commodity turnover as a whole for the oblast rose by 1.3-fold. Prior to 1986, the volume of the sale of alcoholic beverages was rising and in 1985 was around 50 percent of the volume of the sales of food, while in 1986-1987, it dropped to 37 percent.

Over the decade in rural localities over 3.5 million m<sup>2</sup> of housing were completed with an insignificant and ever-declining share of individual construction. However, the total housing supply rose only by 2.3 million m<sup>2</sup>, as



decrepit and damaged structures were taken out of use. By the end of the decade, a large portion of the housing had a centralized gas supply.

Also increasing was the volume of domestic services in monetary terms, particularly for such as the repair and construction of housing (by 3-fold), the repair and manufacture of furniture (by more than 4-fold), the repair of TV and radio equipment and transport (by 2-fold) and hairdressing services (by 3-fold). The share of the listed services in the total volume of services to the public rose from 26 to 41 percent, however this basically occurred due to increased prices.

The increased number of dining rooms on the sovkhoses and the seats in them (by 1.4-fold), in the total volume of domestic services (by 1.7-fold), the connecting of housing to utilities and so forth should have contributed to a relative decline in time expenditures for satisfying material and domestic needs (if one does not consider the growth of the latter). However, with an increase in the number of libraries and the book holdings, the accessibility of literature in demand did not rise and the decline in the number of persons attending the movies continued. Although the number of clubs has somewhat risen over the decade (33,000 seats were completed), their operation has not improved. Unfortunately, the clubs continue to be viewed not as places for exercises or in terms of the number of persons studying, but for places for audiences. Positive responses on the work of one club coexist with the reduced functioning of another due to the essence of club workers. The rural workers themselves assess the changes in their standard of living over the last 5-10 years in the following manner (see Table 2).

**Table 2: Change of Living Conditions in Countryside (1975-1985), in % of Number Questioned\***

| Sphere of Activity                            | Became Better | Did Not Change | Became Worse |
|---|---------------|----------------|--------------|
| Transport services, roads                     | 64            | 27             | 8            |
| Domestic services                             | 51            | 24             | 17           |
| Working conditions                            | 48            | 32             | 7            |
| Conditions for raising and educating children | 44            | 32             | 11           |
| Medical services                              | 56            | 30             | 6            |
| Conditions for recreation, leisure            | 22            | 43             | 19           |
| Trade services                                | 41            | 29             | 27           |

\* The table does not give data on persons not replying.

An improvement in the main conditions for running the private plot was noted by less than 1/2 of those having such a plot. More often they noted an improvement in the conditions for selling the products, the broadened sale of young livestock and feed (41-42 percent) and help from the nationalized farms (37 percent of the owners of private plots questioned). A smaller portion of those questioned noted an improvement in the attitude of the

leaders toward the private plots (30 percent) and in providing pastures and hay fields (20 percent) and feed (16 percent).

During the period between the surveys, the living conditions of the rural population, both individual-family and settlement as a whole, changed for the better. However, this does not correspond, on the one hand, to the tasks of the social development of the countryside and to the volume of planned capital investments, to the needs of the public or to the objective necessity of improving the working and living conditions of the villagers in the general context of the nation's development and, on the other, to the economic indicators and primarily the dynamics in the volume of agricultural products and labor productivity.

Before the repeat survey on the basis of our results from studying the time budgets of the rural and urban population and a comparison with the data of other research, hypotheses were formulated on the trends in the dynamics of time use over the past decade. We assessed the general workload of the rural workers, particularly those employed directly in agriculture as well as the women, as excessive. It was assumed that the process of the urbanizing of the countryside and a rise in the technical equipping of labor lead to a certain decline in working time. The freed time is distributed among running the private plot and the household and for women also for free time. Leisure becomes more diversified. There is less of a difference in the amount of the overall workload and free time between working men and women as well as between the inhabitants of different types of villages. But what actually happened?

The overall characteristics of working conditions including the ratio of working and nonworking days in the week remained virtually unchanged. The granting of days off was somewhat more systematized and the average (actual) length of leave was increased. Among the confirmed hypotheses we would mention the increased working time in the private plot and household, the reduction in working time for women and a certain drawing together in the forms of the use of time for working men and women, for rural and urban workers (males).

The hypotheses were not confirmed on a decline in the overall workload, for the reduced differentiation between the time budgets of inhabitants of different types of settlements, for a certain rise in free time and the share of active, developing activities in this, while the actual status of women declined. The time of the overall workload (work time in social production, the time related to work, the time of labor in the household and the private plot as well as the tending of children) increased both for men and women. And a large portion of this increase was due to the private plot and approximately equally to the running of the household and tending children. Thus, there was not a redistribution in the overall workload, but rather an increase in it due to the household and the private plot.

It can be said that there was a process of extensive growth in the expenditures of time (labor) on satisfying primary requirements with a relative drop in the proportional amount of labor in social production. In actuality, time expenditures rose on labor which really, in a natural form, contributes to satisfying these needs. Housework is the "self-providing" of domestic services, the preparing of food and the producing of a number of things essential for the family. Work on the private plot provides food products which are becoming ever-scarcer and this food is both for consumption in the family as well as for delivery to a consumer cooperative and obtaining the right to purchase scarce nonfood goods as well as for sale. Of course, labor on the nationalized farm provides the worker with a number of benefits in addition to wages. However, its actual importance showed a tendency to decline in comparison with labor on the private plot. With insignificant changes in the size of the private plot, this led to a rise in its proportional efficiency, that is, to an increase in the production volume, to reduced losses of the produced product and to the growth of saleable commodity surpluses.

A reserve for the growth of the extensive workload was the free time, and for men it was also the time for sleeping. The measures to combat drunkenness had among their positive consequences a shortening of sleep and an increase in the amount of labor, as alcohol consumption usually led to the well-known state characterized by inactivity in free time and sometimes during work time. However, as a whole, the extensive growth of the workload, particularly for women, must be viewed negatively, considering the possible consequences of a weakening of health in the present and future generations; a reduction in labor potential; the underdevelopment of needs the satisfying of which encourages labor; continued migration from the countryside, particularly by the youth and young women; a deepening of differences between city and country workers in conditions of labor, everyday life, recreation and development.

Very indicative were the changes in the summer time budget of working women. With a reduction of 2.5 hours in working time, the duration of housework increased by almost as much, and the even greater growth in the duration of labor on the private plot and a certain increase in time expenditures on tending children in amount coincide with a significant reduction in free time and the time for satisfying physiological needs. Under such conditions, it is scarcely possible to speak about the better use of free time. Rather it is the contrary. Of all undertakings related to free time, there was only an increase in the length of time spent watching television as well as physical culture and amateur activities for the men. The already insignificant expenditures on improving skills and education and social work also declined. Analogously with the dynamics of urban budgets, expenditures declined on amusements (basically movies and concerts) but, in contrast to the city, reading time for men also declined.

All of this, in our opinion, shows not a reduction in the importance of free time for the rural inhabitants but rather a stronger influence of the general living conditions expressed in the need for great labor expenditures to satisfy primary material requirements. Here also, of course, one could feel the little development of the cultural and sports sphere and less prestige and practical importance for education and skills.

It can be said that all the difficulties in the economic and social situation of society to a noticeably greater effect are felt by the rural inhabitants and among them by the women engaged directly in agriculture. Their overall workload is substantially higher than the average for all rural workers (Table 3). The difference here is basically determined by the greater length of the working time. Here for women there has even been a decline in the time for tending children, let alone sleep and leisure. Naturally, leisure is merely of a recuperative and informational nature.

**Table 3: Weekly Time Budget of Agricultural Workers, Hours**

| Type of Activity                         | Winter |      |       |      | Summer |      |       |      |
|--|--------|------|-------|------|--------|------|-------|------|
|  | Men    |      | Women |      | Men    |      | Women |      |
|  | 1975   | 1986 | 1975  | 1986 | 1976   | 1987 | 1976  | 1987 |
| Labor in socialized production           | 58.2   | 52.2 | 47.8  | 46.1 | 62.6   | 68.0 | 48.4  | 44.0 |
| Occupations related to work              | 3.6    | 4.9  | 5.1   | 4.8  | 4.1    | 4.0  | 5.1   | 7.5  |
| Housework                                | 3.6    | 3.3  | 23.3  | 25.5 | 4.4    | 2.7  | 18.4  | 23.0 |
| Labor on private plot                    | 8.9    | 11.4 | 11.3  | 8.7  | 10.6   | 19.4 | 22.3  | 29.1 |
| Including tending livestock and poultry  | 7.0    | 10.2 | 8.8   | 6.6  | 2.6    | 6.3  | 9.7   | 13.2 |
| Tending children and exercises with them | 1.4    | 2.4  | 4.1   | 3.0  | 1.0    | 1.0  | 2.7   | 2.4  |
| Satisfying physiological needs           | 69.1   | 65.9 | 61.1  | 65.0 | 63.5   | 56.0 | 57.1  | 52.0 |
| Including sleep                          | 58.2   | 54.3 | 51.8  | 52.4 | 52.9   | 44.3 | 46.5  | 41.4 |
| Free time                                | 23.1   | 27.5 | 14.8  | 14.2 | 20.9   | 16.4 | 12.9  | 9.1  |
| Including: amusements                    | 1.8    | 0.6  | 2.0   | 0.1  | 1.2    | 0.5  | 1.1   | 0.1  |

**Table 3: Weekly Time Budget of Agricultural Workers, Hours (Continued)**

| Type of Activity                               | Winter |      |       |      | Summer |      |       |       |
|--|--------|------|-------|------|--------|------|-------|-------|
|  | Men    |      | Women |      | Men    |      | Women |       |
|  | 1975   | 1986 | 1975  | 1986 | 1976   | 1987 | 1976  | 1987  |
| Reading  | 4.5    | 3.2  | 1.2   | 0.3  | 1.6    | 0.8  | 0.4   | 0.4   |
| Watching television                            | 6.1    | 14.5 | 5.8   | 8.2  | 3.3    | 4.4  | 2.8   | 2.8   |
| Receiving, visiting guests                     | 3.6    | 2.6  | 2.0   | 2.7  | 5.4    | 3.0  | 3.4   | 1.7   |
| Physical culture and sports exercises          | 0.5    | 3.3  | 0     | 0.1  | 2.4    | 3.1  | 0.6   | 1.4   |
| Other activities                               | 0.1    | 0.4  | 0.5   | 0.7  | 0.9    | 0.5  | 1.1   | 1.9   |
| Total workload (including caring for children) | 74.8   | 72.6 | 89.9  | 86.7 | 82.3   | 94.8 | 96.5  | 105.6 |

Substantial differences have survived in the time budgets of workers living in different types of villages. The differentiation increased basically due to the growth in

the general workload of inhabitants of small villages (see Table 4).

**Table 4: Time Budget of Rural Workers Depending Upon Types of Settlements for Annual Average Week of 1986-1987, Hours\***

| Types of Activity (time expenditures) | Men                  |       |       |       | Women                |       |       |       |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                       | Types of Settlements |       |       |       | Types of Settlements |       |       |       |
|                                       | I                    | II    | III   | IV    | I                    | II    | III   | IV    |
| Total workload                        | 84.2                 | 82.3  | 77.9  | 68.5  | 91.8                 | 93.6  | 91.2  | 81.5  |
| Including:                            |                      |       |       |       |                      |       |       |       |
| Labor in nationalized production      | 58.8                 | 57.2  | 49.4  | 43.1  | 39.5                 | 39.4  | 36.7  | 37.0  |
| Time related to work                  | 4.0                  | 4.0   | 4.1   | 4.1   | 4.5                  | 4.2   | 4.1   | 3.6   |
| Labor on private plot                 | 18.1                 | 17.8  | 18.7  | 11.9  | 19.4                 | 22.6  | 16.9  | 12.0  |
| Housework                             | 3.3                  | 3.3   | 5.7   | 9.4   | 28.4                 | 27.4  | 33.5  | 28.9  |
| Sleep, eating, caring for oneself     | 63.4                 | 63.9  | 61.3  | 67.1  | 61.0                 | 57.9  | 60.8  | 65.0  |
| Other activities                      | 0.6                  | 1.0   | 1.0   | 0.9   | 1.5                  | 1.5   | 1.6   | 1.0   |
| Total                                 | 168.0                | 168.0 | 168.0 | 168.0 | 168.0                | 168.0 | 168.0 | 168.0 |

\* The time budgets are calculated considering the actual ratio of workdays and days off in the winter and summer as well as sick days, the duration of the used regular and training leaves, leaves related to the birth of a child and caring for it, types I and II are unurbanized settlements with a little- and medium-developed economic structure, types III and IV are urbanized settlements with a medium-developed and developed economic structure.

Thus, our hypotheses were only partially confirmed, since it was not assumed that the changes in rural life (above all, in the production sphere) would be so significant. To a definite degree, the opportunities for satisfying growing domestic and cultural needs through the sphere of social production were exaggerated.

The problem of the workload with its extensive character, low efficiency and substantial negative consequences must be called one of the main problems in the socioeconomic development of the countryside and indeed all society. If one were to determine the groups of the working rural population which are under the worst (and deteriorating) conditions, then one would mention women working in agriculture and the inhabitants of small villages.

In rendering the nationalized economy more labor than is envisaged by the legislation, a rural inhabitant nevertheless is unable to provide his existence with the most

essential thing, food products. For this he must still invest a good deal of labor in his own garden in giving way to the old belief that without this a village is not a village and a peasant is not a peasant. At the same time, experienced specialists feel that a fundamental change in the character of agricultural production, in the relationship of the private and nationalized sectors, with the internal development (or reconstruction) of one or another will be through leasing, cooperatives and contractual forms.

In practical terms, there is the question of the economic, legal and social basis for selecting that form, that type of labor which would provide a material situation for a family corresponding to modern needs which would help bring out the abilities of a person and make the necessary contribution to the socioeconomic development of the collective, the territorial community and the nation as a whole. As for now, in essence we can see an obvious and

also invisible coercion into labor and the virtual absence of choice. Perestroika is actually aimed at eliminating this unique exploitation of the rural inhabitants, having granted the producers economic independence, legal rights and social protection. The examined 10-year period can be described generally as years of extensive development in agricultural production with a change in the balance of nationalized and individual forms of labor in favor of the latter. Such a change is an unique expression of the objective trend toward intensification and the demand to convert to an intensive, antiexpenditure path of development, as paradoxical as this might sound. A rise in the energy- and capital-to-labor ratio, with an insignificant increase and often even with a reduction in the production volume, is the basis for such a transition.

Let us point out that in the formulating of the hypotheses, regardless of the words about the constantly growing needs, a certain stability of these was generally understood and with an improvement in the living conditions this should lead to a change in the structure of activities, to the decline of "economic" occupations and to the growth of "spiritually developing" ones.

In actuality, of course, this is not the case. In the first place, demands and chiefly primary ones, that is, material and domestic (for food, things and income) are growing rather quickly and clearly with varying intensity for the different socioterritorial groups (in the countryside, probably, relatively more quickly than in the city). Secondly, the improvement in the living conditions and the satisfying of demands have constantly lagged behind the needs of the public and, strictly speaking, also behind the objectively possible rates of improving these conditions, if we were to proceed from economic potential in society. To this, it must be added that the very measuring of living conditions and particularly their changes has become ever-less precise (for example, one of the main indicators for the standard of living is the level of monetary income and this is not compared with the price index or the cost of living and this makes it even less informative). In the third place, the role and level of other demands have been exaggerated and primarily for education, leisure, for aesthetic and physical development and so forth. This has had a dual consequence: on the one hand, the necessary conditions have not been created for the effective forming, developing and satisfying of such demands, and primarily for the younger generation, in the process of education (socialization). On the other hand, the notion has become widespread of a sort of automatic growth in free time and an improvement in its use with a drop in working time.

The basic factor for future changes in the way of life and in the utilization of time will be the change in economic relations in the sphere of agricultural production, that is, the spread of the lease, the contract, cost accounting, individual, family and cooperative forms of labor. Clearly, in the initial stage an increase in working time will be inevitable. Although under the new conditions of management, there will be greater importance for the

intensity of utilizing working time and the promptness of labor expenditures by periods of time in accord with the agricultural production cycle. At the same time, the further development of producer independence, greater efficiency of the equipment and skills of the workers as well as the development of cooperative and other direct interfarm ties can lead to a change in the private farm, its merging with the "socialized," and to its loss of its natural [in-kind] character. However, this can only be the result of natural economic development and here any restricting, prohibiting or ordering measures are inadmissible.

The new forms of labor and the economic relations in the production sphere will also develop a need for improving skills and mastering new professions. The increased income and intensity of labor will bring about a substantial rise in the need for active, "healthy" and interesting leisure. All of this will require both more free time as well as better material support for the corresponding undertakings. And here cooperatives can play an important role. Each rural inhabitant will do what he can do best, whether this is in the sphere of labor or recreation and will exchange the results of his activities with others. Of course, an explanation of the apparent trends would be more profound under the condition of analyzing the dynamics in the differentiation of the various social groups (inhabitants of different types of villages, the vocational-sectorial, age, "migrational," and skill-occupational groups of workers as well as pensioners and women employed in housework). Such analysis is the task in the next stage of the research.

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### Suicides in Mirror of Statistics

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[Text] Social pathology studies the deviations in the behavior of people and the development of social processes. In the opinion of V.N. Kudryavtsev, social pathology is the name given to the most serious cases of deviation from the social standards of conduct and characterized by "substantial" harm for society and the individual. Among these one could put: crime, alcoholism, prostitution and suicide [1].

Deviations from the norm can be studied in terms of absolute and relative indicators (for example, per 100,000 of the population). In the latter instance, we obtain the level of pathology.

The problem of assessing the social situation from the viewpoint of pathological deviations from the norm has

been repeatedly raised in the works of Soviet and foreign specialists. However, the situation has been assessed on the basis of an aggregate of sociodemographic indicators. We, however, propose that for the assessment it is possible to use the generalizing social background of a specific region. In our view, such an all-encompassing parameter is the suicide rate as an extreme form of social pathology. This indicator is closely linked to the level of other socially deviant phenomena such as drunkenness and alcoholism, drug addiction and substance abuse, crime, the spread of mental illnesses and so forth.

An analysis of suicide statistics provides interesting results which we will endeavor to briefly set out for the readers. In 1987, 54,000 persons died in the USSR of suicides or 22 percent of the total number of persons killed in accidents, poisonings and injuries. The suicide rate which is ordinarily calculated per 100,000 inhabitants in 1987 was 19 cases and this approximately corresponds to the West German level (21) or for France (22), although it is higher than in the United States (12). As for the dynamics of this indicator, this is shown in Table 1 [2].

**Table 1: Dynamics of Suicide Rate in USSR**

| Years | Number of Suicides<br>(total, 1,000) | Number of Suicides (per<br>100,000 inhabitants) |
|-------|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1975  | 66                                   | 26  |
| 1980  | 71                                   | 27  |
| 1984  | 81                                   | 30  |
| 1985  | 68                                   | 25  |
| 1986  | 53                                   | 19  |
| 1987  | 54                                   | 19  |
| 1988  | 56                                   | 19  |

Let us point out that the suicide rate is approximately 3-fold higher than the murder rate, and this ratio has remained virtually unchanged; secondly, the suicide peak occurred in 1984, and then there was a substantial drop in their number and this has been linked by many specialists to the intensifying of the antialcohol policy.

It must also be pointed out that the suicide rate among men is 3-fold higher than among women. In 1987, this was, respectively, 30.4 percent and 9.3 percent of the total number of persons killed in accidents, by poisoning and injury. A particularly large excess is observed in men at the most active age (25-39 years) of some 6-fold. As a whole, among males 80 percent of the suicides are for persons of working age, while among women it is already 54 percent during pension years.

There are also great differences in the suicide rates by Union republics (see Table 2). The highest indicator is noted in Estonia and the lowest in Armenia with a difference of over 15-fold. One can clearly trace two polar groups of Union republics with the Baltics and the RSFSR, on the one hand, where the rate is substantially higher than the average and the Transcaucasus and

Central Asian Republics, on the other, where it is substantially lower (particularly in the Transcaucasus). An intermediate group is made up of the republics where the suicide rate is close to the Union average. These are Moldavia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan. Thus, the republics having the highest level of socioeconomic development at the same time hold a leading position in terms of the number of suicides.

**Table 2: Number of Suicides by USSR Union Republics (per 100,000 inhabitants), 1986**

| Union Republic | Number of Suicides |                  |                  | Ratio of Urban Suicides to Rural |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
|                | Total Population   | Urban Population | Rural Population |                                  |
| Estonia        | 27.4               | 24.5             | 35.6             | 68.8                             |
| Lithuania      | 25.3               | 21.3             | 32.5             | 65.6                             |
| Latvia         | 25.3               | 21.2             | 33.9             | 62.5                             |
| RSFSR          | 22.9               | 21.2             | 27.5             | 77.1                             |
| Moldavia       | 18.6               | 13.5             | 23.1             | 58.4                             |
| Ukraine        | 18.5               | 16.7             | 22.1             | 75.6                             |
| Belorussia     | 17.8               | 14.5             | 23.3             | 62.2                             |
| Kazakhstan     | 16.5               | 17.7             | 14.7             | 120.4                            |
| Kirghizia      | 9.2                | 12.1             | 7.2              | 138.9                            |
| Turkmenia      | 8.6                | 12.1             | 5.6              | 216.1                            |
| Uzbekistan     | 7.5                | 11.0             | 5.0              | 220.0                            |
| Tajikistan     | 5.2                | 10.8             | 2.4              | 450.0                            |
| Georgia        | 4.6                | 4.0              | 5.2              | 76.9                             |
| Azerbaijan     | 3.4                | 4.8              | 1.9              | 252.6                            |
| Armenia        | 1.8                | 1.9              | 1.6              | 118.8                            |
| USSR           | 18.8               | 18.4             | 19.4             | 94.8                             |

Interesting results are provided by an analysis of the ratio of the suicide rate for the urban and rural population. Among rural inhabitants suicides are more rarely encountered for the nation as a whole. But this is characteristic only for a portion of the regions. All the Union republics can be divided into two large groups: the first where the suicide rate among the urban population is lower than among the rural and is around 70 percent and this is the republics of the European USSR, the RSFSR and Georgia (a total of 8 republics). The second group where the ratio is inverse, that is, the level of urban suicides is higher than in rural localities by an average of 2-fold, includes the Republics of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus (except Georgia) and Kazakhstan. Thus, the first ratio can conditionally be termed European and the second an Asian type of the frequency of suicides.

For the Asian type, this is explained, in the first place, by the substantially higher share of children among the rural population where suicides among the representatives of this population are extremely rare and, secondly, by the

ethnic and religious traditions which condemn this phenomenon and are widespread among the rural population which is also prevalent in the Asian republics; thirdly, the given ratio, in our view, shows the better social situation in the rural locality as the specific interpersonal relations in a large family with many children helps its members emerge from stalemated situations in life; and, finally and fourthly, rapid urbanization in traditionally nonindustrial regions more quickly destroys the customary way of life, turning a portion of the population into marginal members.

For the European type, where the suicide rate among the rural population is higher than among the urban, in a majority of instances a bad socioeconomic situation in the countryside is characteristic. The "idiotism of village life" with the existing socioeconomic conditions in the RSFSR and certain other republics probably is already gradually moving from the economic into the genetic plane, in being apparent, in particular, in the increased suicide rate among the rural inhabitants. Possibly, this also is a consequence of urbanization processes which lead to the mass departure of the population for the major cities and the stagnating of village life.

And how do the cities themselves differ in terms of the rate of social pathology? For an analysis, the suicide rate has been calculated for 69 cities. The highest suicide rate was in Izhevsk (33.3) and the lowest in Makhachkala (3.8). The difference is almost 10-fold. What causes this? Let us initially look at the suicide rate in the oblast centers of varying size (see Table 3).

**Table 3: Suicide Rate in Centers of RSFSR Oblast Regions of Varying Size**

| Number of Population                  | Number of Suicides<br>(per 100,000 inhabitants) |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1 million and more (11 cities)        | 16.7  |
| From 500,000 to 1 million (17 cities) | 21.8  |
| Under 250,000 (11 cities)             | 18.8  |
| Average for oblast centers            | 18.4  |

The highest suicide rate is in cities with from 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants, some 21.8. This is higher than the national average (19.1) and for the USSR urban population (18.7). The average suicide rate is somewhat lower in the cities over a million with 16.7. Of course, from these data it is impossible to draw categorical conclusions. However, in the most general form it can be assumed that the social situation in the cities over a million is better than in the large towns (from 500,000 to a million), since the former have a higher level of socioeconomic development and in them there is a lower proportional concentration of industrial enterprises both calculated per km<sup>2</sup> of territory and per 1,000 inhabitants.

As for the dependence of the suicide rate upon the administrative status of the center, here we can trace the

following dependence (see Table 4).

**Table 4: Suicide Rate in RSFSR Administrative Centers**

| Administrative Status of City         | Number of Suicides<br>(per 100,000 inhabitants) |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Moscow, Leningrad                     | 14.8  |
| ASSR centers (16 cities)              | 18.6  |
| Oblast centers (45 cities)            | 19.9  |
| Kray centers (6 cities)               | 21.5  |
| Average for centers of oblast regions | 18.4  |

A better situation exists in Moscow and Leningrad. Then (in order of a worsening situation) come the centers of the ASSR, oblasts and, finally, the highest suicide rate is in the kray centers. But while the better social situation in the capital cities is explained by the high level of their socioeconomic development, what explains the bad situation in the kray centers? Probably it is their economic and geographic situation. In actuality, of the six kray centers, four—Barnaul, Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok—are located in Siberia and the Far East, where the social situation as a whole is substantially worse than in the European USSR and in addition Siberia is the traditional place for the concentration of the corrective labor institutions and criminal elements as a whole.

Precisely the economic and geographic situation is the most important factor which determines the specific distribution of the rates of social pathology. For testing this hypothesis we have calculated the average indicators of the suicide rate for cities which are oblast and kray centers in economic regions on RSFSR territory (see Table 5).

**Table 5: Suicide and Murder Rate in Cities Which Are Centers of Oblast Regions in Economic Regions on RSFSR Territory, 1987**

| Economic Regions            | Number of Cases<br>(per 100,000 inhabitants) |         |
|-----------------------------|--|---------|
|                             | Suicides                                     | Murders |
| Eastern Siberian (5 cities) | 23.4   | 14.8    |
| Northern (5)                | 22.4   | 6.2     |
| Urals (6)                   | 22.3   | 7.3     |
| Far Eastern (7)             | 21.7   | 10.4    |
| Western Siberian (5)        | 21.2   | 8.3     |
| Baltic (1)                  | 21.1   | 5.1     |
| Volga (8)                   | 20.9   | 6.1     |
| Volga-Vyatka (5)            | 18.0   | 4.6     |
| Central (12)                | 16.6   | 4.1     |
| Northwestern (3)            | 15.5   | 4.4     |
| Central Chernozem (5)       | 14.7   | 4.4     |
| Northern Caucasus (7)       | 10.6   | 5.2     |
| Average for all centers     | 18.4   | 9.5     |

The highest indicator in the center cities of the Eastern Siberian region (23.4) exceeds the lowest level (10.6) by 2.2-fold. Here the situation "improves" as one moves from the Northeast toward the Southwest.

Analysis indicates that the rate of social pathology in the cities is adequately reflected by the total indicator of the number of murders and suicides. We have classified the centers of the oblast regions of the RSFSR for this indicator (we will term it conditionally the social pathology rate in a city).

The spread of indicators for the social pathology rate is significantly greater than for the murder or suicide rates individually. The worst city of Yakutsk is "ahead" of the best, Makhachkala, by more than 7-fold.

The first class of cities with a very high rate of social pathology includes seven centers. These basically are the small cities of Siberia and the Far East (an average of 377,000 persons). Only one city, Kostroma, is in the Central Region.

The second class of cities (22 cities) with a high pathology rate is basically represented by the cities of the Urals, Siberia, Far East and the Northern European USSR (15 out of 22). As an average, these are larger cities than in the first class (544,000 persons).

In the third class (16 cities) with an average pathology rate are basically large cities of the Central (5 cities) and Volga (4) economic regions. Asia is represented by two Western Siberian cities, Tomsk and Omsk. The average size of the cities in this class is almost 600,000 persons.

The fourth class includes cities with a low pathology rate. These basically are the developed large regions of the Center and Southern European RSFSR (12 cities out of 18).

And finally, the class of cities with the best situation and a very low social pathology rate is represented by three relatively small autonomous republic centers in the Northern Caucasus as well as three comparatively small cities of the Central (Kaluga), Central Chernozem (Belgorod) and Volga-Vyatka (Saransk) Regions.

The analysis made makes it possible to draw a number of conclusions. In the first place, the indicator of the suicide rate as well as the suicide and murder rate together reflects a differentiation of the cities by degree of the deleteriousness of the social situation and as a rough approximation can be used as the central indicator for the social pathology rate. Secondly, in the RSFSR oblast centers, the social situation is somewhat better than in the remaining urban settlements. Thirdly, the best social situation is in the capital centers with a diversified production structure and this is reflected in the low social pathology rate. At the same time, in terms of the suicide rate, the first places are held by oblast centers with a monofunctional industrial specialization (for example, Izhevsk and Kostroma). Fourthly, the social pathology rate to a large degree is tied to the economic

and geographic situation of a city and in those regions where the social situation is bad as a whole, it is worse in the oblast centers. And here the "record holder" is the Eastern Siberian Economic Region. The social pathology coefficient in the oblast and kray centers of Eastern Siberia (38.2 cases per 100,000 inhabitants) is over double this indicator in the cities of the Northern Caucasus Region (15.8). Fifthly, the suicide rate in the analyzed cities is substantially higher than the murder rate (by an average of 3-fold). An exception here are two ASSR centers which have the highest indicators of the murder rate with Kyzyl (27.5 for murders and 16.2 for suicides) and Yakutsk (23.9 and 20.7, respectively). Sixthly, the suicide rate is inversely proportional to the share of children in a city population. Seventhly, no significant correlation was disclosed between the suicide and murder rates in a city.

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2. Here and below all calculations have been made on the basis of the data of the USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee], "Naseleniye SSSR" [USSR Population], Moscow, 1988.

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#### FACTS, COMMENTARIES, COMMENTS (FROM THE SOCIOLOGIST'S DESK)

##### Narcotics Among Minors

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[Article by Grigoriy Yakovlevich Lukacher, doctor of medical sciences, professor and department leader, Nataliya Viktorovna Makshantseva, candidate of medical sciences and senior science associate and Vladimir Arkadyevich Chudnovskiy, candidate of medical sciences and junior science associate. All three are co-workers at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for General and Forensic Psychiatry imeni V.P. Serbskiy; this is the first time they appear in our journal]

[Text] At present, the question is being actively discussed of drug addiction and substance abuse among minors. These illnesses arise as a result of the abuse of narcotics.

In the nation's drug addiction outpatient centers there are juvenile offices where they register juveniles who

abuse narcotics as well as those suffering from drug addiction and substance abuse. The juveniles who are suffering from drug addiction and substance abuse are registered at the outpatient center; juveniles who have shown a single or sporadic abuse of narcotics are on preventive registration. Undoubtedly, the number of persons registered at the drug addiction outpatient centers is less than those actually abusing narcotics.

Juveniles in whom the abuse of toxic and narcotic substances has not been accompanied by the development of a pathological addiction, in coming into the perusal of the researchers, are usually viewed in the context of the forming of drug addiction and substance abuse. As will be shown below, the use of narcotics far from always leads to the problems of drug addiction and substance abuse. It is impossible to put an equals sign between the illnesses of drug addiction and substance abuse, on the one hand, and single or sporadic use, on the other, that is, between the contingent of outpatient and preventive registration in the drug addiction outpatient centers, since in the first instance we are involved with sick persons and in the second, with persons deviating in self-destructive behavior. The corrective measures naturally will differ.

At present, in the published works there is no clear differentiation in these concepts [1-2]. This leads to an increase in the overall number of sick persons and to a situation where minors who do not have a pathological addiction in any event are viewed as future drug addicts. Thus, the Deputy Minister of the USSR MVD S.G. Lisauskas, in taking up the extremely important question of juvenile crime, pointed out that of the 9,000 juveniles who had tried drugs, in almost 1,500 "a permanent diagnosis of drug addiction was established. Add to them the around 12,000 young substance abusers" [2]. By a permanent diagnosis of drug addiction they clearly mean that these juveniles are sick with drug addiction. Consequently, the remaining 7,500 are healthy. The impression is created that the author views substance abuse as something milder, less dangerous than drug addiction. In actuality, both these illnesses are severe, they envisage the presence of a pathological addiction and differ only in the legal viewpoint (whether the narcotic is considered a drug or toxic substance). Such a variant reading impedes the organization of preventing the given deviant conduct as it reduces it merely to antidrug.

In previous publications [3] we have presented the preliminary results of clinical sociological research on juveniles who abused drugs and toxic substances as well as drug addict and substance abuse patients. The given work is a continuation of the designated research. Moreover, our task also included a study of the social characteristics of juveniles of the same age and not abusing narcotics and a comparison of the obtained results. The research was carried out in 1987-1989.

Let us make the essential explanations of a terminological nature. The works of E.A. Babayan [4-5] examine in detail the various states caused by the taking of narcotics

and the appropriate terminology is offered. However, researchers frequently resort to the differing designation of the same phenomena and this prevents mutual understanding, causes different interpretations and at times distorts the essence of the phenomenon. Let us give some examples. Thus, it is completely wrong to replace the term "substance abuse agent" with the term "toxic agent" as far from every agent, in being toxic, causes the corresponding mental state (stupefaction and not intoxication, as in the use of alcohol) or develops a pathologic addiction. In terming the consumption of narcotic and substance abuse agents, including even once, "abuse," the thrust is to emphasize the legal aspect of this action and the violating of the socially accepted standards. In the given context "abuse" means not a quantitative exceeding of the acceptable but the very fact of consumption which is considered a deviation.

The social characteristics have been studied in 588 juveniles registered with five drug addiction outpatient centers in Moscow. Their number in each outpatient center varied from 100 to 160 persons. An absolute majority (94-96 percent) was comprised of those who abuse drugs and substance abuse agents singly or sporadically. A significantly smaller portion is made up of juveniles sick with drug addiction and substance abuse. There was a single abuse of narcotics in 57 percent of the juveniles, sporadic in 38.4 percent and substance abuse in 3.6 and ephedron addiction in 1 percent. The juveniles abused tranquilizers, demerol, cyclodol, volatile solvents and a home-made compound containing ephedron. Particularly frequently used were volatile solvents and tranquilizers (respectively 35 percent and 29 percent). Young men prevailed among those investigated (86 percent).

The level of prosperity in the families of the juveniles was satisfactory. In 42 percent of them there was a complete family, in 13 percent a disturbed one and in 45 percent an incomplete family. As a rule, the parents had a secondary or incomplete secondary education (34 percent and 62 percent, respectively) and a low cultural level. There was not the required parental upbringing. The parents did not know about the interests and involvements of their child and did not create conditions for the development of the child's spiritual and moral sphere, limiting themselves to satisfying its material needs and a formal declaration of the existing value guidelines. Such a type of upbringing (hypoprotection) of the juveniles often became a lack of any supervision. In 5 percent of the juveniles, the parents had been deprived of their parental rights due to an asocial way of life (parasitism and drunkenness). In the immediate circle of 1/3 of the juveniles, persons predominated with negative behavior (persons with previous convictions or abusing alcohol). The juveniles who were in such a microsocial group accepted such conduct as proper.

In all those studied, drug and toxic substance abuse was preceded by smoking and in a majority also by alcohol.



The first abuse of a narcotic in 82 percent of those questioned occurred at the age of 15-16 years. By this time, the juveniles knew about the existence of drugs and toxic substances, about the effect produced by them, relying on the myths of their harmlessness for the organism. Some 92 percent of them obtained such information from friends, while the others mentioned TV broadcasts as the sort of information.

By the time of the first abuse of drugs and toxic substances, 72 percent of the juveniles had studied in 8th grade of the general education school or the first year of the SPTU [secondary vocational-technical school]. Some 2 percent of the juveniles suffered from oligophrenia to a degree of slight debility, 4.2 percent in their anamnesis noted an earlier organic injury to the brain, and 3.4 percent of the juveniles showed a predisposing heredity (alcoholism, schizophrenia in the parents). Some 90.4 percent of the juveniles were healthy. The first drug or toxic substance was taken upon the advice of friends or out of curiosity. The juveniles explained this as follows: "I was bored," "You had to do something." Virtually none pursued the goal of overcoming any difficulties in life; the juveniles did not feel that such existed in their life.

Typical was the group nature of taking narcotics. The groups formed at the place of residence or study. The juveniles were not united by any permanent interests and their view of the world was sharply limited. In the referral group, relations developed completely satisfactorily, while outside this group the juveniles did not have and made no effort to have friendly contacts with other persons of their same age or with adults. Two types of groups can be established. A portion of the juveniles (40 percent) came together into groups having an asocial nature and they consumed alcohol, participated in thievery and vagrancy and were often under bad microsocial conditions. As a rule, here the abuse of narcotics was sporadic. Groups of the remaining juveniles (60 percent) were not of an asocial nature and the group members basically had correct social orientations but they had a limited view, there was no interest in studies, there was no active desire to acquire any specialty, although they did realize the necessity of working in the future. Among the juveniles of such groups, abuse of drugs and toxic substances was both one-shot "experimental" and sporadic.

In both groups the abuse of narcotics and alcohol (as a rule, combined) was not of independent interest and was merely a method for spending their leisure time. The juveniles did not consider that the narcotic consumed by them was capable of causing a pathologic dependence.

With the exception of 5 juveniles (0.8 percent) who had committed illegal actions and 15 (2.5 percent) who were released from military service because of state of health, all the remaining young men, upon reaching the age of 18, were considered fit for service in the Soviet Army.

It is generally felt that the abuse of narcotics ultimately leads to illness. Out of the 588 juveniles under observation, correspondingly 3.6 percent and 1 percent suffered from toxic substance abuse and ephedron addiction. Characteristically in virtually each there had been a previous organic injury to the brain or predisposing heredity. We did not see a pathological addiction arising in the juveniles who were on preventive registration (maximum period of observation was 2 years). For developing drug addiction and toxic substance abuse, the abuse of a drug or toxic substance is a necessary but not a sufficient and certainly far from the crucial condition, since the existing drugs and toxic substances and agents possess a differing ability to cause a pathologic addiction. The particular features of juvenile age must be viewed as contributing to the abuse of narcotics, but the process of developing a pathologic addiction is not so rectilinear and depends upon many biological factors.

The impression may be created that drug and toxic substance abuse is characteristic of juveniles studying in the SPTU. We conducted a solid survey of the students in the first year of one of the Moscow SPTU (172 persons) and schoolchildren in the 8th grade (82 persons) and 9th-10th grades (166 persons) in two general education schools of Moscow.

The following was discovered. The SPTU students have socially acceptable views, a clear notion of their profession and real plans for the future. Some 67 percent of the juveniles had a complete family and not a single one had an asocial circle. The parents had an incomplete secondary and secondary education (33 percent and 26 percent, respectively). Some 78 percent of the students voiced a negative attitude toward smoking and asserted that they themselves did not smoke. In the words of instructors, many more juveniles smoke and there are instances of alcohol abuse. Not one of the respondents was registered with the police because of delinquent conduct. These juveniles also were not registered at the drug addiction outpatient center. The circle of their interests included sports, adventure, literature and science fiction as well as rock music. The respondents were indifferent to the questions of economics, politics, morality and so forth.

A majority of the pupils in the 8th and 9th-10th grades had a complete family (respectively, 75 percent and 76.5 percent). Some 54.2 percent of the parents of the 8th graders had a higher education and 71 percent of the parents of the seniors. Only one student in the 8th grade was registered with the police because of delinquent behavior. In the words of the pedagogues, 6.2 percent of the 8th graders had been noticed abusing alcohol but none of the pupils was registered at the drug addiction outpatient center. There were no asocial persons either among the adults or among the contemporaries comprising the close associates of the pupils. Upbringing according to the type of hypoprotection was noted in 8th graders (10.8 percent) as well as among the students of the 9th and 10th grades (respectively, 5.4 percent and 4 percent).

The students in 9th-10th grades had a clear notion of their desired profession in the future; 85 percent of the 10th graders were preparing actively to be admitted to an institute. Over 80 percent of the pupils participated in social work, while in the SPTU it was only 42 percent of the first-year students. The respondents from 9th-10th grades were much more willing than their contemporaries from the SPTU to discuss questions concerning socioeconomic and political aspects of life; they were interested in literature and art.

It is not to be excluded that certain respondents (both pupils and students of the SPTU) had abused drugs and toxic substances, although they denied this in the interviewing. Clearly it is possible to speak about an experiment. In this sense, our respondents were close to the juveniles the groups of which do not have an asocial character but are registered at the drug addiction outpatient centers.

All of the pupils and SPTU students knew about the existence of narcotics. In discussing this question, no interest was voiced and they replied formally. They had obtained their information from the press, radio and TV broadcasts as well as from lectures given in their schools.

Unfortunately, the current antidrug propaganda is not carrying out its tasks. Certain researchers feel that because of this the number of drug abusers is even growing [6]. However, in our opinion, the reasons of abuse are deeper and are determined primarily by the conditions of the microenvironment.

We were able to establish that the juveniles from the SPTU had formed positive value orientations which had been inculcated in the family. The forming of such orientations was not impeded by the fact that the parents of a majority of the respondents did not have a high educational level and in the families sufficiently much attention was given to the raising of the children and to their correct social orientation.

The educational level of the parents influences the choice of profession by the child. In 96 percent of the juveniles registered at the drug addiction outpatient center, the parents did not have a higher education. However, it cannot be said that this circumstance creates favorable conditions for the development of abuse in the juvenile. From the example of the SPTU students, we can see that this is not the case. But, as was shown by the research, among parents having a low educational level, we more frequently observed the upbringing defects described above. Moreover, in the immediate circle of the juveniles registered at the drug addiction outpatient center, rather often there were persons present with asocial conduct, and in these instances abuse was usually combined with other forms of deviant behavior. Such anomalous conditions also contribute to a situation where the juveniles begin to abuse narcotics.

The juveniles registered at the drug addiction outpatient center were raised in an incomplete family more frequently (45 percent) than the remaining respondents

(23-30 percent). At the same time, in the incomplete families surveyed by us, the juveniles had adequate value orientations and were not poorly developed intellectually. The above-described disturbances were not found in their upbringing or microsocial environment. Clearly the absence of one of the parents, while complicating the conditions for raising the child, is not a factor which contributes to the development of abuse.

The juveniles registered at the drug addiction outpatient centers in Moscow for drug and toxic substance abuse form a rather homogeneous group the members of which are marked by an insufficiently high educational and moral level and by bad microsocial conditions. Abuse of narcotics can be viewed as deviant behavior and, using the classification proposed by V.V. Kovalev [7], considered in the nonpathologic forms of deviant behavior. Having arisen as a nonpathologic form of deviant behavior, the abuse of drugs and toxic substances in a number of instances is closely linked to other nonpathologic deviations of conduct (infractions) and can be transformed into drug addiction and toxic substance abuse, that is, acquire the character of a pathologic form of deviant conduct.

The most widespread version of juvenile abuse of drugs and toxic substances is single or sporadic abuse and this is the only form of their deviant conduct.

Analysis shows that the reasons for the abuse of narcotics have a social character. A juvenile turns to narcotics not because he is endeavoring to escape from the difficulties of life but rather because abuse seems to him the most natural and accessible method of spending his leisure. If the need arises for him to perform more significant actions (including asocial ones), he easily gives up the narcotics.

Drug and toxic substance abuse can be explained by the failure to form intellectual interests and by a warping of notions concerning social and moral values.

Let us emphasize that drug and toxic substance abuse for juveniles acquires independent significance only in a few instances (according to our data, 4.6 percent), when they develop a pathological addiction, that is, drug or toxic substance addiction develops. But in a majority of instances, drug and toxic substance abuse can be viewed as a definite subculture. This is most characteristic for juveniles leading an asocial way of life. Such a conclusion is valid only in those instances when they abuse narcotics which do not possess a great ability to cause a pathologic addiction, as is currently occurring among the Moscow juveniles. With high addictability of the narcotic, we can expect the development of drug addiction and toxic substance abuse among a larger number of abusers.

The reasons for the abuse of narcotics by juveniles have a social character and should be viewed within the context of nonpathologic deviant conduct. The prevention of abuse can be successful only with a social improvement in society itself.

The presented data make it possible to draw definite conclusions on the need to change the form of help for the juveniles. The existing medical aid cannot be considered satisfactory as it is formal, it comes down to the mere stating of the fact of abuse and includes only administrative measures. Due to the physiological features of age, juveniles are a risk group on the level of the developing of various deviations in behavior. Medical and pedagogical correction is advisable and this should be carried out in specialized preventive institutions with the involvement of a physician specializing in drug addiction.

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### Articles Not Translated

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